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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores impediments to regime change using the strategy of nonviolent 
action, through an integrated examination of consensual power theory as articulated by 
Gene Sharp and Antonio Gramsci, and by incorporating James Scott’s theory that 
observable consent in the public discourse can belie a private realm of resistance to a 
system of domination. Using the context of the 2011 Libyan uprising, this thesis 
analyses the reality of consensual power in Libya to explain what factors precluded 
nonviolent action succeeding in the 2011 revolution.  
 
Critically evaluating the theories, this study examines a wide range of information 
about the historical, political, economic and social power structures of Libya and the 
significance of these factors in the 2011 Libyan revolution. By clearly elucidating the 
internal dynamics of the Libyan system, this thesis argues that domination and not 
consent served as the primary source of political power for Qadhafi’s revolutionary 
regime and thus Sharp’s strategy of withdrawing consent does not fit the reality of 
Libya. Additionally, consent must be understood as a vastly more complex 
phenomenon if nonviolent strategy is to be successful in the future.  
 
 
 
 
iv 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:  
 
i. incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a 
degree or diploma in any institution of higher education; 
 
ii. contain any material previously published or written by another person except 
where due reference is made in the text; or 
 
iii. contain any defamatory material.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Siobhan Lynch:  _______________________ Date:  5 November 2012 
 
 
 
 
v 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Ross Calnan 
without whom I would have never commenced my undergraduate degree or believed I 
could write an honours thesis.  Ross, I thank you for believing in me even when I did 
not believe in myself, and I am ever grateful to you for encouraging me to have the 
courage to discover who I am and what I am capable of.  Your words of wisdom will 
remain with me always.  
 
My special thanks go to my mother Glyn Hezakiah a.k.a. ‘The Old Goat’ and 
stepfather Phillip Foster for their support throughout my six-year mature age 
educational journey. I am thankful to you both for what you consider the ‘small things’ 
(although ‘big things’ in my book) such as having me over for dinner, delivering cat 
food, arranging dry cleaning, buying me a coffee, and just generally making the day-
to-day jobs that less of a burden to enable me to concentrate on my thesis. 
 
I would also like to thank my supervisor David Robinson for his ceaseless enthusiasm 
for my thesis topic, and for sharing his passion for the study of history. David, thank 
you so much for keeping me on the right path, and for making the experience of 
learning both a cerebral and humorous adventure. 
 
I am very thankful to the three wonderful ladies with whom I work Toni Watson, Liz 
Moore and Gillian MacDonald. Thank you all for listening to me rant on about my 
thesis even when neither you nor I had any idea what I was banging on about. Thanks 
for being so supportive throughout this journey and for being so flexible with working 
arrangements. You are all amazing women and I feel extremely fortunate to have such 
wonderful work colleagues that I also consider good friends. 
 
Last but most definitely not least, I would like to thank Gene Sharp for his tireless 
dedication to the study of nonviolence which provided me with the inspiration for 
writing this thesis, and also to the Libyan people whose own courage emerged after 
over four decades under dictatorial rule. 
 
 
 
vi 
Table of contents 
 
 
Use of thesis……………………………………………………………………………i 
 
Cover page……………………………………………………………………...……...ii 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..iii 
 
Declaration…………………………………………………………………………….iv 
 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….....…v 
 
Table of contents………………………………………………………………………vi 
 
Glossary………………………………………………………………………………vii 
 
Maps…………………………………………………………………………………viii 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….1 
 
Chapter One: Historiography and theory…………………………………………...….6 
 
Chapter Two: A history of consent…………………………………………………...18 
 
Chapter Three: The green shadow of domination………………………………….....30 
 
Chapter Four: The 2011 Libyan uprising - a search for the sources of violence……..44 
 
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….....56 
 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..61 
 
Appendix A – Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from 1969 to 1975………...70 
 
Appendix B – Structure of People’s Authority System……………………………….71 
 
Appendix C – Methods of expressing disapproval (%)…………………………….…72
 
 
vii 
Glossary 
 
 
ASU – Arab Socialist Union 
BPC(s) – Basic People’s Congresses 
Cyrenaica – the eastern coastal region of Libya 
Fazzan – the southern province of Libya 
GPC – General People’s Congress 
Green Book – Qadhafi’s ideological primer for Libya’s political, economic and social 
structure 
hadith – the collected sayings of the Prophet Muhammed 
ihsan – the highest form of worship where a connection to God is established through 
the Prophet Muhammed and his companions 
Jamahiriyya – Arabic word with no official translation but unofficially translated to 
mean “state of the masses” 
jihad – holy war 
PC(s) – People’s Committees 
PSLC(s) – People’s Social Leadership Committees 
RC(s) – Revolutionary Committees 
RCC – Revolutionary Command Council 
RCLB – Revolutionary Committees Liaison Bureau 
sharia – moral code and religious law of Islam 
Sufism - form of Islamic mysticism   
sunna – a collection of traditions about the life and habits of the Prophet Muhammed 
Tripolitania – the most populous of Libya’s three historic regions, situated in the north-
western part of the country 
ulama – religious scholars learned in sharia law 
zawiya – religious lodge/school of the Sanusiya Order 
 
 
 
viii 
Maps 
 
Libya and its provinces 
 
QuickTime™ and a
 decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
           Source: Vandewalle (1998) 
 
Libya’s tribal territory 
 
QuickTime™ and a
 decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
  Source: Davis (1987) 
 
 
1 
Introduction  
 
The four-decade-long revolutionary rule of ‘Brother Leader’ Muammar Qadhafi ended 
on 20 October 2011 when after a protracted eight-month civil war he was killed at the 
hands of his own people (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2011b). In early 2011 
nonviolent protests swept Tunisia and Egypt overthrowing the long-standing 
dictatorships of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. While Libya appeared next 
in line to oust an entrenched dictator using nonviolent action, the strategy could not be 
sustained and swiftly deteriorated into violent conflict. Although the revolutions in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and subsequent uprisings, have been collectively termed the 
‘Arab Spring’, this terminology belies profound differences in internal dynamics and 
grievances that sparked the protests (Anderson, 2011). This study will be examining how 
Libya’s historical context and contemporary situation led to a violent outcome in the 
2011 uprising – a vastly different result to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. 
 
Libya has a long history of foreign domination: subjugation to the Ottoman Empire from 
1551 for nearly four centuries, then Italian colonialism from 1911 for another three 
decades (Anderson, 1983; Ahmida, 2009). After Mussolini’s Fascist regime lost Libya 
during World War II, the country was placed under British and French administration 
from 1942-51. Thereupon the United Kingdom of Libya was declared on 24 December 
1951 uniting the provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fazzan under the monarchical 
rule of Idris al-Sanusi, who claimed legitimacy as heir to the Sanusiya religious 
movement (Davis, 1987; Vandewalle, 2006). During the first decade of independence 
Libya overwhelmingly relied on foreign aid for its survival, but with the 
commercialisation of oil in the early 1960s Libya transformed into a super-prosperous 
nation (Naur, 1986; St John, 2008). Nevertheless, with political activities proscribed, and 
with substantial oil revenues placing immense strain on kinship as the sole mechanism 
for economic distribution, politically disenfranchised Libyans began demanding change 
(Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2011). 
 
On 1 September 1969 the revolutionary regime of Muammar Qadhafi usurped the 
monarchy’s power and imposed a socialist system of government (Bearman, 1986; El-
Kikhia, 1997). While the Colonel initially garnered popular support through Islamic 
rhetoric, symbolic gestures of national independence, and charisma, his increasingly 
radical interpretation of Islam alienated the Libyan people (Takeyh, 2000; St John, 
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2011). Through extensive oil revenues the revolutionary regime implemented an 
idiosyncratic political and economic system of ‘direct democracy’ in which political 
authority was ostensibly vested in the Libyan people but in reality sole power was 
conferred upon Qadhafi (Vandewalle, 2008). From the 1980s to the early twenty-first 
century Libya was a pariah state in which declining oil prices, combined with trade 
sanctions over Qadhafi’s alleged support for global terrorism, reduced the regime’s 
ability to pacify its citizenry (St John, 2011). Following the regime’s renunciation of 
weapons of mass destruction in December 2003 Qadhafi embarked upon further 
economic reforms but failed to generate support among an alienated, apathetic population 
(Vandewalle, 2008). The regime’s 2011 downfall highlights an opportunity to analyse 
the internal dynamics of the Libyan system, investigate what motivated an apparently 
apathetic population to rebel, and examine why nonviolent resistance proved insufficient 
to effect change.  
 
Gene Sharp is considered “the father of nonviolent struggle” (CNN, 25 June 2012) and is 
the world’s foremost expert on nonviolent revolution (Christian Science Monitor [CSM], 
16 June 1986; Martin, 1989; BBC News, 21 February 2011). The 84 year-old American 
academic has devoted most of his life to the study of nonviolence, for which he received 
a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in 2009 (BBC News, 21 February 2011; New York 
Times [NYT], 16 February 2011). While Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr 
are synonymous with nonviolence, Sharp has theorised nonviolent technique for 
application within wide-ranging contexts. The central tenet of Sharp’s work is that rulers’ 
power is derived from the consent of subjects, and that withdrawing consent using 
nonviolent techniques diminishes that power (Sharp, 1973; BBC News, 21 February 
2011). Sharp’s nonviolent strategy is credited with inspiring global uprisings from 
Thailand, Indonesia, Bosnia and Zimbabwe, to the downfall of the Milosevic regime in 
Serbia, and propelling the Eastern European revolutions of the early 2000s (BBC, 21 
February 2011; NYT, 16 February 2011). More recently, Sharp’s scholarship is believed 
to have been a major influence for the 2011 Arab Spring, particularly in Tunisia and 
Egypt (NYT, 16 February 2011; CNN, 25 June 2012). 
 
Another prominent political theorist of consensually based power is Antonio Gramsci, 
the twentieth-century Italian philosopher who was imprisoned under Mussolini’s fascist 
regime from 1926 until his death in 1937 (Forgacs, 1999). While imprisoned Gramsci 
wrote the Prison Notebooks where he developed his theory of hegemony, arguing that 
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the dominant group in society maintains dominance through the ‘spontaneous consent’ of 
subordinate groups: such consent is not based purely on economic interests nor force and 
coercion but is rather reliant upon political and ideological consensus (Bates, 1975; 
Jackson Lears, 1985). 
 
In contrast James Scott questions consensual power by focusing on how subordinate 
groups resist domination. In Scott’s view, understanding systems of domination cannot 
solely rely on examining interactions between the dominant and subordinate groups in 
the public discourse, but must also incorporate offstage forms of resistance to be 
discovered in the subordinate group’s private world (Scott, 1985, 1990). Scott argues that 
subaltern groups have not consented to domination, which can be evidenced through 
everyday forms of resistance. This paper will be drawing on Gramsci and Scott’s theories 
to examine Sharp’s theory of nonviolent action.  
 
While nonviolent action has proven successful within a variety of contexts, such as 
Tunisia and Egypt, the strategy could not penetrate the situation in Libya where violent 
conflict eventually liberated Libyans from the seemingly inexorable Qadhafi regime. 
Libya’s 2011 uprising thus provides a prime opportunity to explore impediments to 
regime change using the strategy of nonviolent action. The analytical framework for this 
thesis will comprise a study of the prominent political theorists introduced above: Sharp, 
Gramsci and Scott will provide an integrated approach to examining consensually based 
power in relation to nonviolent technique. The 2011 Libyan revolution then provides the 
context in which to explore the reality of consensual power, where potential limitations 
of nonviolent action will be identified. As Ruth First eloquently stated after Qadhafi 
came to power: 
 
 There is no denying the special cast given the Libyan revolution by the 
 idiosyncratic  character of Mu’ammar Gadafi…[but] to explain Libya by the 
 temperament,  eccentricity, even instability of Gadafi is to make no meaningful 
 explanation in terms of history and Libyan society…while this might help in 
 explaining Gadafi, what explains the Libyan response to him. (First, 1974, 
 p. 20) 
 
Consequently, taking into account First’s point and considering the space necessary to 
adequately discuss the Libyan system’s complexity, that the original intention to devote a 
chapter of this paper to analysing Qadhafi’s character through political psychology has 
been sequestered for discussion at a time when there is ample scope to do the topic 
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justice. Similarly while Arab nationalism, Qadhafi’s foreign policy exploits, and the 
impact of international sanctions have contributed to Libya’s internal situation, these 
areas will only be explored where necessary for contextualisation due to the size 
constraints of this dissertation. 
 
Plato once stated “I may assume that your silence gives consent” (Jowett, 2011, p. 39). 
However, does not such an assumption underestimate the ambiguity of silence? Thus 
determining the truth of this statement informs a fundamental argument of this thesis – 
what is the meaning of that silence? While overt expressions of dissent were highly 
unusual in Libya, to purport that behavioural or perceived active ideological support in 
the public discourse is indicative of consent underestimates the population’s private 
realm of dialogue, where everyday modest and usually anonymous acts could provide 
evidence against the assumption that silence gives consent. The primary concern of this 
thesis is to examine the Libyan people’s response (both overt and covert) to Libya’s 
power structures, explaining what factors precluded nonviolent action during the 2011 
Libyan revolution and how these factors reflect on Gene Sharp’s theory.  
 
This thesis contends that contrary to Sharp’s assumption that consent is always the basis 
of political power, in accord with Gramsci where consent fails domination serves as the 
primary source of political power supporting Scott’s assertion that apparent consent in 
the public discourse can actually disguise resistance to domination. Qadhafi’s system of 
‘direct democracy’ was in reality a façade behind which the Colonel ultimately 
controlled Libyan power structures leaving most Libyans powerless and apathetic, which 
became the breeding ground of violence. Once consent failed Qadhafi ruled Libya 
through a system of domination in which the Libyan citizenry was left politically and 
economically alienated, socially fragmented, with any opposition suppressed by a 
pervasive security apparatus. Thus it will be demonstrated, using the Libyan context, that 
the effectiveness of nonviolent action is limited where consent is not the underlying 
source of power, and that consent is a vastly more complex phenomenon than asserted by 
Sharp. 
 
This thesis is divided into this introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The first 
chapter includes a literature review and discusses the major ideas of the three theorists.  
Through the theoretical framework of consensual power, chapters two and three will 
examine a history of consent and structures of domination in Libya. Chapter four will 
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culminate in a discussion of the 2011 Libyan uprising’s nodes of violence. Findings and 
recommendations regarding consensual power and the effectiveness of nonviolent action 
will be presented in the conclusion. 
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Chapter One:    Historiography and theory  
 
 
 
 
 
Making sense of modern Libya has proven challenging for scholars due to its tightly 
controlled institutions and scarcity of data, not to mention the Qadhafi regime’s 
contradictory directives. Vandewalle claimed, “no analyst has ever figured out precisely 
how the system works” (1986, p. 34). Nevertheless, a select group of authors have 
produced well-researched, comprehensive accounts of the Libyan system’s internal 
dynamics. The following sources have provided invaluable context for an understanding 
of Libya’s contemporary situation. To understand Libya one must explore its historical 
roots based on Islam and the tribe. Evans-Pritchard (1949) provides a deep-historical 
analysis of the Islamic Sanusiya Order’s developmental history from its absorption into 
the Bedouin tribal structure to its transformation into a political organization. 
Additionally, Ahmida (2009) explains how Sufi Islam and tribal military organization 
fuelled the resistance against colonialism, and how the political and cultural legacy of 
resistance strengthened Libyan attachment to Islam. Both Anderson (1986) and Davis 
(1987) document the strength and resilience of the tribal system from integration into the 
Ottoman Empire to revival under Italian control.   
 
Around the theme of contradiction, First (1974) studied Libya from 1969-73 during four 
visits in the immediate post-revolution period, highlighting the regime’s contradictions 
such as using fundamentalist religion to create socialist revolution. El-Kikhia (1997) 
concentrates on Libya’s political system ostensibly controlled by the Libyan people but 
actually dominated by Qadhafi using chaos and turbulence to ensure the regime’s 
survival. St John (2008, 2011) too focuses on contradiction, initially tracing the 
development of the revolutionary state and then emphasising the inconsistency between 
its rhetoric of ‘direct democracy’ and day-to-day life in Libya. Vandewalle’s (1995, 
2008) edited works from a select group of academics provides insight into Libya’s 
political, economic and social organization from its earliest history, to independence, 
through to the 1969 revolution and beyond. 
 
“Libya is a difficult country to know, let alone analyse” 
 
(Cited in First, 1974, p. 24) 
 
 
 
7 
Libya’s political and economic development, were dominated by massive oil revenues 
under both the Sanusiya monarchy and Qadhafi regime, leading to the neglect of modern 
state institutions as ideological aspirations were instead pursued. Allen (1981) provides a 
detailed historical analysis of Libya’s economic situation prior to oil, and how the 
discovery of oil impacted on Libya’s political and economic development. Additionally, 
Vandewalle (1998) examines Libya’s lack of institutional growth since independence 
arguing that Libya was a ‘distributive state’ in which economic largesse was favoured at 
the expense of institutional expansion and economic sustainability. 
 
Of central importance to this research are three empirical studies conducted in Libya over 
four decades1. El Fathaly and Palmer (1980) evaluate the regime’s mobilization and 
modernization efforts in the four years after the 1969 revolution concluding the regime’s 
goals were not achieved. Obeidi (2001) analyses how the regime’s ideology influenced 
the political beliefs, values and attitudes of Libya’s younger generation, concluding 
significantly that the regime was neither successful in developing politically active 
citizens nor in cultivating an alternative social base to the tribal system. While Al-
Werfalli (2011) examines the extent and effect of political alienation in Libya, in which 
common behaviours such as apathy and violence are linked to the depoliticization of the 
Libyan population. 
 
While the 2011 Libyan revolution was widely reported, the primary source materials 
were chiefly gathered online from reputable news media such as the BBC News, the 
Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times and Amnesty International News. The 
news reports assist in examining the Libyan uprising’s initial nonviolence and the extent 
of the subsequent violent conflict. Additionally, news reports provide insight into recent 
events that fuelled the insurrection; elucidates the role of the tribes and military during 
2011; and describes Qadhafi’s responses. The newspaper accounts also allow for basic 
comparison between the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions that preceded the situation in 
Libya. 
 
                                                 
1 El Fathaly and Palmer collected information using questionnaires and personal interviews with the 
population of Zawia province in 1973 (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). Obeidi’s study is based on research 
conducted in 1994 with male and female students at the University of Garyounis in Benghazi (Obeidi, 
2001). In 2001 Al-Werfalli conducted a survey and interviews with residents of the Al-Orouba quarter in 
Benghazi (Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
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Gene Sharp has written extensively on nonviolence originating with his 1951 masters 
thesis Nonviolence: A Sociological Study, to his 1968 doctoral dissertation The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action: A Study in the Control of Political Power. Sharp’s seminal 1973 work 
The Politics of Nonviolent Action articulates his theory on the nature and control of 
political power and catalogues 198 methods of nonviolent action into three broad 
categories: protest and persuasion; noncooperation; and nonviolent intervention, 
providing central principles for socially based action and each method’s relative impact 
(Sharp, 1973). Sharp’s Social Power and Political Freedom (1980) built further on his 
theory of power and delineated civil society’s role in controlling power through 
nonviolent action. 
 
Sharp’s most disseminated text, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual 
Framework for Liberation, is a handbook on how to overthrow dictatorships using his 
198 nonviolent methods. From Dictatorship to Democracy, originally written for the 
Burmese democratic movement in 1993, is available in over 30 languages and is free 
from Sharp’s Albert Einstein Institute – founded in 1983 to promote nonviolent action 
globally (BBC, 21 February 2011; New York Times, 16 February 2011). 
 
Sharp has written approximately 30 books on nonviolence, including: 
• Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power: Three Case Histories, 1960 
• Civilian Defense: An Introduction, 1967 
• Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, 1971 
• Gandhi as a Political Strategist with Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1979 
• National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense, 1985 
• Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and 
Defense, 1985 
• Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence 1765-1775, 1986 
• Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System, 1990 
• The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggles, 1990 
• Self-Reliant Defense Without Bankruptcy or War, 1992 
• Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide, 1997 
• Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty First Century 
Potential, 2005 
• Self-Liberation: A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or 
Other Oppression, 2010 
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• Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in 
Conflicts, 2011 
 
Gene Sharp is considered the Machiavelli of nonviolence (Christian Science Monitor, 16 
June 1986), and for all modern Machiavellians the interdependence of force and consent 
are fundamental to any theory of power (Bates, 1975). For Sharp, a ruler’s power 
depends on the political obedience of their subjects derived through a combination of 
free consent and fear of sanctions (Sharp, 1973). From this ruler-subject-dichotomy 
perspective, Sharp determined that power is not monolithic: while the ruler may hold 
centralised power this is not a permanent and unchangeable arrangement. 
 
For Sharp, power is pluralistic and dependent upon an intricate structure of human and 
institutional relationships for its reinforcement (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 1980; Sharp, 2005). 
Sharp has termed these independent groups and institutions ‘loci (or places) of power’, 
including family, social, cultural and religious groups, government bodies and political 
parties. Where loci are effectively dispersed throughout society, such loci will regulate a 
ruler’s power and that of other loci. However, if no significant loci exist, challenging a 
ruler’s power will have limited effect (Sharp, 1980). 
 
Sharp maintains that beyond the state power is rooted in society itself, so the more 
extensive the ruler’s control over society, the greater cooperation the ruler will require 
from the individuals they rule (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2005). The degree of cooperation and 
obedience of the subjects, which remains essentially voluntary despite sanctions, 
determines the extent to which a ruler can access sources of power upon which the ruler 
is dependent (Sharp, 1973). 
 
Sharp identified six sources of political power; it is rare for all six sources to be 
completely available or totally absent (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2005). The sources of 
political power are: 
• Authority: the extent to which people voluntarily accept the ruler’s 
authority/legitimacy without the imposition of sanctions. The greater the authority, 
the more obedience the ruler will receive.  
• Human resources: the number of people who are obedient and cooperate with the 
ruler, or provide special assistance. 
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• Skills and knowledge: the abilities and skills of the people obeying and cooperating 
with the ruler. 
• Intangible factors: psychological and ideological factors that influence behaviour and 
attitudes toward obedience, and the presence or absence of a common ideology or 
faith. 
• Material resources: the extent to which the ruler controls natural resources, financial 
resources, the economic system, property, transportation and communication. 
• Sanctions: the type and extent of coercive measures to enforce obedience (Sharp, 
1973; Sharp, 2005; Sharp, 2010). 
 
Consent is central to Sharp’s theory of power. Sharp reasons that people provide consent 
out of: habit; fear of sanctions; moral obligation; self-interest; psychological 
identification with the ruler; indifference; and an absence of self-confidence to disobey 
(Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2005). While various social forces influence the reasons for 
obedience, ultimately the individual’s will or opinion determines consent (Sharp, 1973). 
For instance: subjects obeying out of habit choose not to consciously examine their 
compliance; certain individuals may dislike a ruler or system but obey out of self-
interest; and even in the case of sanctions a subject makes a choice to obey to avoid 
punishment (Sharp, 1973). 
 
Sharp emphasises that “the obedience of subjects is essentially the result of the act of 
volition” (Sharp, 1973, p. 26). Sharp is clear that consent can either be ‘free’ consent or 
what he has termed ‘intimidated’ consent through fear of sanctions, either way consent is 
determined by the individual’s will or choice (Sharp, 2005). With a ruler’s political 
power overwhelmingly determined by the subjects’ willing obedience, power may be 
weakened by shifting conditions affecting the individual’s will and reasons for 
cooperating (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 1980; Sharp, 2005). A ruler may counteract a loss of 
obedience by increasing the reasons to obey, such as harsher sanctions or greater rewards 
for loyalty. However, a change in the subjects’ will, may lead to withdrawal of consent 
from the ruler and thus their service and cooperation to the sources of political power 
(Sharp, 1973). 
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We have arrived at Sharp’s strategy of nonviolent action based on the premise that the 
pluralistic nature of power enables subjects to withdraw consent and thus control or even 
destroy a ruler’s power sources (Sharp, 1973). The extent to which a ruler’s power is 
weakened depends not only on the quality of nonviolent action and number of nonviolent 
protestors, but also on the dominant political and social milieu (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 
2005). Sharp acknowledges that society’s structural conditions influence the 
effectiveness of withdrawing consent; where autonomous social groups and political 
institutions expand to create ‘democratic space’ the greater strength society will have in 
controlling the ruler’s power (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2010). Accordingly, society’s strength 
is weaker in highly centralized states that strongly control institutions and social groups 
(Sharp, 1980). Under such conditions significant power-wielding groups, the ‘loci of 
power’ will either be absent or incapable of independent action, increasing the difficulty 
of controlling the ruler’s power through modification of power sources (Sharp, 1980). 
 
Nevertheless, Sharp stresses that incongruence between the formal government structure 
and the structural condition of society leaves the ruler’s power dependent on the vigour 
of social organization and the subjects themselves (Sharp, 1980).  Irrespective of the 
prevailing formal government structure, through individual human agency consent can be 
withdrawn to challenge the power of a ruler. Refusal to consent requires knowledge on 
how to resist, motivation to resist, self-confidence and willingness to experience 
inconvenience and suffering (Sharp, 2005). Political freedom is not bestowed on subjects 
by the ruler nor does formal structures of government alone determine degrees of 
freedom or set limits on a ruler’s power. While people depend on the support of their 
government, governments conversely depend on the good will of their people (Sharp, 
1973; Sharp, 1980). 
 
Critics of Sharp (Lipsitz & Kritzer, 1975; Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 1993) dismiss his 
consensual power theory as not being identifiable in all power relationships, lacking 
detailed structural analysis and being too restricted to capture political systems’ full 
dynamics. For Martin (1989) Sharp’s power theory based on a ruler-subject dichotomy 
neglects political life’s complexity, ruling out the structures of capitalism, patriarchy and 
bureaucracy as systems of power. Martin (1989) argues that capitalism can 
simultaneously benefit and oppress those living within the system, just as patriarchy 
cannot simply be extinguished by withdrawing consent. McGuinness (1993) too is 
critical that Sharp’s theory overlooks patriarchy as a system of power, in which consent 
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is of limited value in terms of gender relations. Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) stress that 
political power is not always about controlling people but could simply be used to 
control resources or territory.  
 
Consent as viewed by Sharp has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on human 
agency and choice, overlooking structural limitations (McGuinness, 1993; Atack, 2006). 
Wehr, Burgess and Burgess (1994) argue that for subordinate groups choice can at most 
be considered cooptation (positively leveraged) or coercion (negatively leveraged), and 
that these ‘choices’ do not constitute consent as a viable alternative is absent. For Atack 
(2006) the term consent underestimates a far more complex individual dealing with 
oppression at multiple levels: the individual’s internal psychological world, pragmatic 
social relations of daily life and with state institutions. 
 
In McGuinness’ (1993) view a shared political culture underpins consent, therefore 
consent will only be present where a shared culture exists – just as a common set of 
values are required when consent is withdrawn. For Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) if a ruler’s 
goal does not involve extracting submission directly from their subjects, then a ruler’s 
power will not be dependent on consent. If Sharp has failed to adequately characterise 
power then his strategy of withdrawing consent may also be inadequate (McGuinness, 
1993). Despite these criticisms, Martin (1989) merits Sharp’s strategy as being ideal for 
stimulating action whereas structural approaches are better suited to analysis. 
Nonetheless, for Sharp’s critics power is a much more complex phenomenon than 
articulated in his consensually based strategy of nonviolent action. 
 
Supporting Sharp’s theory of consensually based power is Antonio Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony, which proposes that the ‘spontaneous’ consent of the general population to 
the dominant worldview imposed by the ruling group is the basis for control in society 
(Bates, 1975; Jackson Lears, 1985). For Gramsci, hegemony is about ruling through 
ideas not force: the ruling group procures active or passive consent from society rather 
than ruling by sanctions alone (Thomas, 2009). Adamson (1980) offers two related 
presuppositions for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Firstly, consensual power 
predominates the political system as opposed to the state’s monopoly on coercive power; 
and secondly, the economic base of the state must be overcome to advance to a 
consciousness of common cultural, intellectual and moral awareness. Thus hegemony as 
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distinguished by Gramsci is exercised primarily through a society’s ‘superstructure’ as 
opposed to the base or ‘structure’. 
 
The superstructure comprises political society as the site of coercive power and civil 
society as the site of hegemonic leadership (Bocock, 1986). Only where hegemonic 
leadership involves the organic cohesion of intellectual, philosophical, moral and 
emotional consent between the ruler and subjects will the relationship be representational 
(Bocock, 1986). As Gramsci understood it, the moment of hegemony goes beyond a 
theory of state-as-force: hegemony involves active struggle between state-civil society 
relations and depends on shaping the consciousness of civil society through validation of 
the dominant group’s ideas and values in the public discourse (Jackson Lears, 1985; 
Morton, 2007). 
 
Fundamental to Gramsci’s theory is the dialectical integration of the theoretically distinct 
moments of consent with coercion, and hegemony with domination. For Gramsci, within 
the ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony force and consent are both evident, although one 
factor usually predominates (Jackson Lears, 1985; Morton, 2007; Thomas, 2009). 
Gramsci considered political hegemony as the moment in which civil society as the 
terrain of consent and political society as the location of force make contact (Bates, 1975; 
Jackson Lears, 1985; Thomas, 2009). At times Gramsci ascribed to consent active 
commitment to the established order, while at other times Gramsci alluded to the 
ambiguous nature of consent whereby an individual’s conscious thoughts sometimes 
conflicted with their actions. 
 
Consent, for Gramsci, reveals the contradictory and complex reality of consciousness 
that combines resistance with resignation and approbation with apathy (Jackson Lears, 
1985). While consent provides a method of control, the role of force should not be 
overlooked, for in Gramsci’s view hegemony and domination are strategically different 
components of a unitary political power. For Gramsci hegemonic rule is epitomised in 
the diffusion of a consensual viewpoint throughout society and its interrelation with the 
state’s coercive apparatus, without force undermining consent (Bates, 1975; Adamson, 
1980; Morton, 2007). Nonetheless, where the creation of genuine hegemony fails the 
state will fall back on the coercive apparatus constructed in anticipation when 
‘spontaneous’ consent declines (Bates, 1975).   
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With consent accorded increasing primacy in Gramsci’s theory his ‘structure’ as the site 
of the social relations of production was recast to include only the material and technical 
instruments of production – enabling differentiation between the economic base and the 
‘superstructure’ (Jackson Lears, 1985; Bocock, 1986). Gramsci considered the ‘structure’ 
as simply the dominant mode of production, whereas the ‘superstructure’ comprised 
long-standing private institutions such as family and religious groups, and public 
institutions such as the government and army (Bates, 1975; Bocock, 1986). For Gramsci, 
hegemony goes beyond the ‘structure’ to the complex realm of ‘superstructures’ where 
ideas are introduced, consciousness is raised, an individual’s awareness of conflicts with 
the world of production is realised, and where economic sacrifices are made to appeal to 
wider social groups (Morton, 2007; Thomas, 2009). 
 
In Gramsci’s vision civil society does not come before nor lie beyond the state, but is 
rather integrated with political society – responsible for adjusting civil society to the 
economic, leaving civil society the marketplace of ideologies (Bates, 1975; Morton, 
2007; Thomas, 2009). Hegemony for Gramsci is all about ideologies which must 
penetrate both the structure and superstructure – where the ideology is historically 
organic it will have validity in moving people and elevating consciousness, but where 
arbitrarily applied its longevity will be limited (Bocock, 1986; Forgacs, 1999). Gramsci 
concluded that the structure will not determine forms of consciousness but rather what 
forms are possible, and that through interaction between the structure and superstructure 
a ‘historical bloc’, to be discussed next, may be formed where a coherent ideology will 
attempt to establish hegemony (Jackson Lears, 1985; Forgacs, 1999). 
 
Bringing Gramsci’s theory together are the key concepts of the ‘integral state’ formed of 
civil society and political society and the ‘historical bloc’ as the dialectical unity of 
structure and superstructure (Bocock, 1986; Thomas, 2009). The integral state is based 
upon a set of common ideas and a shared philosophy in which active consent is procured 
through interaction between state-civil society, the moment of hegemony, rather than 
through fear of sanctions (Morton, 2007). Gramsci’s notion of a historical bloc is the 
infusion of hegemony throughout society, initially through class alliances but then 
through the relatively organic relationship between the structure or economic life with 
that of the superstructure or political and cultural life (Adamson, 1980; Jackson Lears, 
1985). 
 
 
 
15 
For Gramsci, while hegemony must stem from a historical bloc not all historical blocs 
become hegemonic. For hegemonic success a historical bloc’s economic and ideological 
viewpoint must appeal to wide-ranging groups within society and claim some validity as 
representing society’s interests at large (Adamson, 1980; Jackson Lears, 1985). When 
‘organic crisis’ occurs in which the historical bloc in its entirety (both the structure and 
superstructure) is no longer able to manifest hegemony or where hegemony has not been 
established, the dominant group will resort to rule through force (Bates, 1975; Jackson 
Lears, 1985). 
 
Scott (1990) proposes an alternative view of consensually based power, suggesting that 
the complicit behaviour of subordinates observable in the ‘public’ transcript (the 
discourse of political society) could merely be a tactic; without also incorporating the 
‘private’ transcript of subordinate groups the public transcript cannot elucidate the whole 
story. Scott (1985) is cautious of any assessment of power that infers active ideological 
support from observable compliance. For Scott (1985), there are at least two possible 
interpretations to explain observable consent: subordinates actively or grudgingly accept 
the hegemonic order; the alternative being acceptance through domination. Although 
subordinates conform to expected behavioural norms in the public transcript, such 
conformity could mask a vastly different private transcript (Scott, 1990). 
 
In Scott’s opinion (1990) the feigned behavioural compliance of subordinate groups in 
the public transcript is possible when a private transcript is created where subordinates 
act out in fantasy the natural impulses of rage and anger denied reciprocal action in the 
public transcript – these muted impulses provide the content of the private transcript. 
Scott (1985) argues that the public transcript’s convincing behavioural and ideological 
conformity is often a façade behind which resistance will be evident in the private 
transcript. It is Scott’s assertion (1990) that the political life of subordinate groups is not 
to be found in absolute hegemonic compliance nor in overt defiance but on the terrain 
between these two opposites – in the discourse and action of the private transcript 
intersecting with the public transcript.  
 
For Scott domination, in which ‘real’ choice is absent, creates the pseudo-hegemonic 
order that makes it impossible to distinguish from the public transcript alone whether the 
prevailing hegemony is based on willing consent or coerced compliance (Scott, 1990). 
Scott (1990) argues that through the practice of domination in the public transcript the 
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private transcript of subordinate groups is created – a private transcript that will match 
the intensity of the domination experienced. For Scott (1990) the public transcript 
becomes the stage on which the subordinate group offers a performance of deference and 
consent while privately surveying the dominant groups real intentions, and where the 
dominant group polices for any signals of subordinate resistance that might weaken their 
public mastery and ideological justification for domination.  
 
Of central importance to Scott is the idea that there is always an ambiguous, coded, and 
sanitized version of the subordinate group’s private transcript in the public transcript, 
providing terrain to examine ideological resistance and pseudo-hegemony (Scott, 1990). 
Distinguishing between the hegemonic ambition of the public transcript and the private 
transcript of subordinate groups reveals a variety of political dialogues in which some 
subordinates support the prevailing ideology for their own interests, while for others a 
dissident culture is created that is completely obscured from the public transcript – then 
there is the realm between these two where subordinates inject coded messages of their 
private transcript into the public transcript (Scott, 1990). 
 
It is the coded private transcript within the public transcript that provides evidence of a 
pseudo-hegemonic order, with the prevailing conformity in the face of domination 
simply an act of survival and repression of violent impulses (Scott, 1990). For Scott, the 
constant dialogue between acts of resistance and thoughts about resistance facilitates 
access to the realm of consciousness of subordinate groups where lines of action that are 
presently impossible but plausible in the future are revealed, thus challenging the 
dominant group’s hegemonic ambition both behaviourally and at the level of 
consciousness (Scott, 1985). 
 
The art of political disguise is paramount to Scott’s assertion that evidence of the private 
transcript of subordinates can be recovered from the public transcript. These forms of 
disguised and anonymous resistance include but are not limited to false compliance, 
feigned ignorance, foot dragging, gossip and rumour, which can be individually or mass 
enacted and avoids direct confrontation with the dominant group (Scott, 1985; Scott, 
1990). These anonymous acts may take on more physical forms such as arson, pilfering 
and violence; however, they more often manifest as passive noncompliance such as 
evasion and deception (Scott, 1990). For instance, while grumbling stops short of making 
an explicit statement it enables subordinates to express dissent publicly without 
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provoking retaliation from the dominant group.  Grumbling releases feelings of anger, 
disloyalty and contempt from the private transcript in a vague form into the public 
transcript revealing a larger story (Scott, 1990). 
 
The advantage of political disguise and acts of anonymity means it is possible to declare 
the private transcript while disguising individual identity. However, the muted nature of 
these acts conspires to create a complicitous silence extinguishing these everyday acts of 
resistance from history (Scott, 1985). While the private transcript of subordinates is 
typically irrecoverable, it is through the muted or veiled forms thrown into the public 
transcript that Scott (1990) believes we can recover some of the private transcript to 
discover a political dialogue of resistance in the public transcript. 
 
The theories detailed above will form the analytical framework for this thesis. Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony will be used to examine the actuality of consent predominating force 
in the Libyan system, and whether this conforms to Sharp’s assertion that a ruler’s power 
is based on consent despite the availability of coercive measures. While Scott’s public-
private transcript perspective will be used to analyse if observable consent in Libya’s 
public discourse provides sufficient evidence of the consensually based nature of power 
as determined by Sharp. 
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Chapter Two:  A history of consent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applying Sharp and Gramsci’s analytical framework, the intent of this chapter is to 
provide an extensive historical narrative of the structures of consent within Libya from 
the mid-nineteenth century through to the first few years of Qadhafi’s revolution. The 
discourse will trace the history of the tribe and Islam as organic superstructures of 
consent, and evaluate the role of these superstructures during the colonial war and under 
the monarchy, where focus on economic largesse to acquire consent will also be 
discussed. The analysis will then turn to the 1969 revolution where mechanisms of 
consent used by Qadhafi to garner authority will be assessed to determine whether 
hegemony was established as Gramsci articulates, and if these mechanisms procured 
consent in the way Sharp asserts. 
 
The Sanusiya Order  
Algerian religious scholar Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi known as the ‘Grand 
Sanusi’ founded the Islamic revivalist movement the Sanusiya Order in Mecca in 1837. 
In 1843 he turned toward Cyrenaica where he established the first zawiya or ‘Mother 
Lodge’ of the Order at al-Azwiya al-Baida on the central Cyrenaican plateau, marking 
the rise and expansion of the Sanusiya Order in Libya2 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Davis, 
1987; Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2008). In Cyrenaica, the Grand Sanusi found an 
essentially homogenous religious culture based on Sunni orthodoxy, which like most of 
North Africa followed the malikite rite based on the primary sources of the Quran and 
hadith3 (Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2008). 
 
The Grand Sanusi’s combination of Sunni orthodoxy and Sufism’s mystical ihsan 
worship resonated with the ascetic tribal ethos of the Cyrenaican nomadic and semi-
                                                 
2 Ever since the Arabs brought Islam to Libya in 642 AD, religion has played a central role in the everyday 
lives of Libyans (Obeidi, 2001, p. 38). 
3 Other orthodox Sunnis also accept consensus/agreement among the faithful (ijma) and analogy/what 
should be believed about the teachings of the Prophet (qiyas) as legitimate doctrinal sources—the Grand 
Sanusi rejected both of these doctrines (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 1; Harris, 1986, p. 32). 
“I love the masses as I love my father, yet fear them in the same way. In a 
Bedouin society, with its lack of government, who can prevent a father from 
punishing one of his children? It is true that they love him, but they fear him 
at the same time. In the same way, I both love and fear the masses, as I love 
and fear my father” 
(Qadhafi cited in St John, 2008, p. 154) 
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nomadic Bedouins, where the Sanusiya found its inner core of support. There were fewer 
adherents among the more cosmopolitan Tripolitanians, and Qadhafi would later oppose 
Sufism’s influence4 (Deeb & Deeb, 1982; El-Kikhia, 1997; St John, 2008). Under the 
Grand Sanusi’s leadership the Sanusiya founded twenty-one zawiyas throughout 
Cyrenaica, and his son and successor Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi brought the 
Sanusiya to their peak of influence by establishing another twenty-two zawiyas by the 
time of his death in 19025 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Vandewalle, 2006). In terms of 
Gramsci’s analytical framework, the common religious and moral basis of Islam formed 
an organic superstructure that bestowed the Sanusiya with the Bedouins’ political 
consent.  
 
Libya’s tribes have traditionally played a major role in inculcating social norms, serving 
as a ‘loci of power’ as described by Sharp or, in Gramscian terms, the site of hegemonic 
leadership in civil society’s superstructure (Sharp, 1980; Bocock, 1986; Obeidi, 2001). 
Thus the Sanusiya Order used the strength of the tribal system to turn an amalgam of 
parochial tribal interests into a powerful religious and political force (Davis, 1987; El-
Kikhia, 1997). With their influence over the Cyrenaican Bedouin tribes firmly 
established, the Order utilised the tribal social system to propel the movement into the 
south-western Fazzan region and to a lesser extent, Tripolitania (Vandewalle, 1995). The 
Order came to be characterised through traditional kinship structures and tribal identities, 
with zawiya established on the basis of tribes or tribal sections rather than towns; this 
tactic was also utilised to manage tribal rivalries6 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Davis, 1987). 
 
As tribal society increasingly came into contact with outside political forces, the 
Sanusiya movement provided a rudimentary structure for tribal political expression, 
crystallizing in Cyrenaica as an opposition movement when a jihad was declared against 
Italian colonialism (Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008). “The tribes provided the Order 
with a social system, and the Order gave to that system a political organization” (Evans-
                                                 
4 The Sanusiya also accept the teachings of the sunna, a collection of traditions about the life and habits of 
the Prophet (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 1). 
5 When the Grand Sanusi died in 1859, a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the Order until 
Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, born in 1844 the eldest of two surviving sons, was of age to lead 
the Order (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 19). 
6 The origin of tribal divisions originated with the eleventh century arrival of two Arab tribes, the Bani 
Hilal who settled in Tripolitania and Tunisia, and the Bani Salim who settled in Cyrenaica and Syrte 
(Obeidi, 2001, p. 43; Ahmida, 2009, p. 46). 
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Pritchard, 1949, p. 91). In Sharp’s terms, the Sanusiya’s power rested on their authority 
and a shared faith with the Cyrenaican tribes, a power they extended by procuring greater 
human resources in the Fazzanese and Tripolitanian tribes (Sharp, 1973). Over the 
Order’s 80-year lifespan the superstructural elements of Islam and tribal life were vital 
for extending the Sanusiya’s hegemonic leadership. 
 
The colonial war 
During the Turco-Italian War 1911-12 resistance formed under the Ottoman government, 
supported by the Sanusiya Order. However, when the Ottomans surrendered Libya to 
Italy in November 19127, resistance continued as a more purely Cyrenaican Bedouin 
struggle in the name of the Sanusiya, now under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad al-
Sharif8 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Anderson, 1983; Vandewalle, 2006). In Tripolitania 
meanwhile, the absence of a cohesive leadership owing to factional disagreements meant 
their action proved relatively ineffective9 (St John, 2008). While resistance proved the 
dominant pattern across the provinces not all Libyans joined the struggle, with merchants 
in Tripoli and urban notables in Cyrenaica collaborating with the Italians, motivated by 
status, power, and economic self-interest (St John, 2008). 
 
During World War I Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif abdicated Sanusiya leadership to his cousin 
Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi who, supported by British authorities, 
garnered back some authority over Cyrenaica from the Italians10 (Anderson, 1983; 
Vandewalle, 2006). Similarly, Tripolitanian notables also seeking to regain control from 
the colonialists formed the Tripoli Republic in 1918, but unable to generate international 
support and enfeebled by internal discord and factionalism struggled to wring 
                                                 
7 Sovereignty to Libya remained divided between Italy and Turkey for some years, until the Ottomans 
signed an armistice treaty with the Allies in October 1918 ending both their involvement in World War I 
and influence in Libya (Anderson, 1986, p. 185). 
8 After the death of Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, his nephew Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif assumed 
leadership falling into three periods: 1902-1912 unsuccessfully opposing French expansion in the Sahara; 
1912-1918 leading the Bedouins of Cyrenaica against the Italians and British; and from 1918-1933 when 
he went into exile, eventually dying in Saudi Arabia (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 27; St John, 2008, p. 13). 
9 Tripolitanian notables, Farhat al-Zawi and Sulayman al-Baruni took opposing positions: the former 
wanted to negotiate with the Italians while the latter advocated continued armed resistance (Anderson, 
1986, p. 188). 
10 Negotiations with the Italians through British intermediaries resulted in two related agreements, Al-
Zuwaytina in April 1916 and Akrama in April 1917 granting Sanusiya sovereignty to the Cyrenaican 
hinterland (St John, 2008, pp. 66-67). 
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concessions from the Italians11 (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; St John, 2008). In October 
1920 when Idris al-Sanusi was granted the title of Amir in Cyrenaica from the Italians, 
the Republic appealed to Idris to extend the amirate into Tripolitania so they might also 
benefit from Italian patronage; after considerable hesitation Idris accepted12 (Anderson, 
1986b; Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008). The Fascist takeover of Italy in October 1922 
ended Italian collaboration with local Libyan elites, and Idris al-Sanusi went into exile. 
This left more martial members of the Order to resist the Italian pacification campaigns, 
where another Sanusiya brother’s leadership would come to the fore. 
 
The Sanusiya Order led resistance against the Italians from 1917 but their role became 
more prominent during the Italo-Sanusi War 1923-32. The Italians had subdued 
Tripolitania by late 1924 but came to expect strong resistance from Cyrenaica, and thus it 
was with most of Libya’s anti-Italian leaders in exile that the Cyrenaican tribal shaikh 
Sidi Umar al-Mukhtar became the resistance figurehead (Anderson, 1986b; Deeb & 
Deeb, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008). Al-Mukhtar embodied the rare qualities 
of marabat (holy man) and mujahid (fighter for the faith) - a combination of religious 
legitimacy and physical endurance that resonated with the Bedouin who made up the 
majority of the resistance  (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Davis, 1987). 
 
Decades of Sanusiya influence resulted in notable cohesion among the Cyrenaican tribes, 
which along with anti-colonialist sentiment ensured the Bedouins remained committed to 
the cause (St John, 2008). Nevertheless, the resistance eventually died in 1931 with al-
Mukhtar, who was captured and subsequently hanged before 20,000 Bedouin. By 1932 
Libya was completely subdued and the Sanusiya Order decimated, however the exiled 
Sanusiya leadership remained Libya’s major indigenous political force13 (Evans-
Pritchard, 1949; Deeb & Deeb, 1982). Aware of the enduring legacy of the colonial 
period, in 1981 Qadhafi commissioned a feature film about the life and exploits of al-
Mukhtar entitled Lion of the Desert, and used anti-colonial sentiment as a platform for 
                                                 
11 The Tripoli Republic consisted of a four person council supported by a twenty-four member advisory 
group. The first formally republican government in the Arab world was not based on republican sentiment, 
rather an inability to agree on an acting head of state (Anderson, 1986, p. 205). 
12 The 25 October 1920 Accord of al-Rajma granted Idris the title of Amir in return for dismantling 
Cyrenican military units and applying the Legge Fondamentale, which provided for a special form of 
Italian-Libyan citizenship (St John, 2008, p. 69).  
13 The Fascist regime was unable to defend its ‘Fourth Shore’ during the North African campaign of 1940-
1943 during World Word II, with Italy eventually signing a peace treaty on 10 February 1947 renouncing 
all rights to Libya (St John, 2008, pp. 78, 91). 
 
 
 
22 
authority after the 1 September Revolution (St John, 2008). In a Gramscian sense, the 
superstructural elements of Islam and tribal military organisation under the hegemonic 
leadership of the Sanusiya order were used as cultural and social weapons to fight against 
colonialism (Ahmida, 2009).   
 
Libya under the monarchy 
On 24 December 1951 the United Kingdom of Libya was declared an independent 
nation, with the title of king conferred upon Idris al-Sanusi claiming religious legitimacy 
as head of the Sanusiya Order (St John, 2008; Vandewalle, 2006). At independence 
Libya lacked a unified political community, thus a federal system14 of government with 
an elaborate and expensive administrative structure of overlapping jurisdictions was 
adopted to balance the capitals, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania15 (Anderson, 1986b). All 
major tribes were represented in the country’s parliament, but with real authority codified 
in the king and his diwan (mainly Cyrenaican tribal elites loyal to the Sanusiya) 
parliament simply acceded to the monarchy’s decisions (Vandewalle, 1998). Moreover, 
after violent clashes marred the first parliamentary elections in February 1952, Libyan 
politics descended into a “kind of benign despotism” (St John, 2011, p. 40) in which 
provincial political structures influenced by tribal leaders and urban notables became the 
principle forums for political competition16 (St John, 2011). 
 
The commercialisation of oil in the 1960s prompted the adoption of a unitary 
government in April 1963 to improve efficiency of the multifarious government 
structures17 (Vandewalle, 1998). Theoretically the unitary system aimed to improve 
governance, cut costs, and streamline administrative systems by centralising services at 
the national level.  In reality, the unitary system increased the power of the king and the 
royal diwan, eviscerating the provincial bureaucracies’ power. The new centralized 
                                                 
14 Cyrenaica and Fazzan favoured a federal system, concerned a unitary government would be dominated 
by Tripolitania where two-thirds of the country’s population lived. Tripolitania argued for a unitary 
government, suggesting a federal system would weaken the central government’s authority to implement 
decisions of national interest (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 47).  
15 By 1958 the total government payroll equalled 12 percent of GNP.  The provincial governments of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica employed more civil servants than did the federal government, which alone had 
a payroll that approached forty thousand employees (Anderson, 1986, p. 256; Vandewalle, 1995, p. 5). 
16 The defeated National Congress Party accused Tripolitania of electoral fraud resulting in violent conflict. 
Henceforth, political parties were outlawed and no multi-party elections were held from 1952 until the 
Qadhafi regime was overthrown in 2011 (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 69; St John, 2008, p. 112). 
17 On paper, the centralized government abolished the three traditional national divisions replacing them 
with ten administrative districts each with its own governor (Harris, 1986, p. 11; St John, 2008, p. 115). 
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government was staffed by a narrow circle of intimates to the king, leaving state 
institutions devoid of real power (Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008; St John, 2011). In 
the unitary environment the king attempted to promote a sense of Libyan nationalism but 
to no avail. Politically, Libyans were disenfranchised from an absolutist political system 
that came to rely on economic handouts for acquiescence (Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 
1995; St John, 2011). Under the monarchy, Libyan politics was characterized by the 
perpetuation of family, tribal, and parochial interests at the expense of a modern state. 
 
The discovery of oil in the late 1950s and its commercialisation in the 1960s profoundly 
changed the economic base of Libyan society18 (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; Vandewalle, 
1995). At independence, Libya was one of the poorest independent countries in the 
world, with 35 percent of GNP accumulated from foreign aid and rental income from 
leasing military bases to the United States and Britain19 (Allen, 1981; Vandewalle, 
1998). In 1960 70 percent of the population was employed in the agricultural sector, 
which only contributed 26 percent to the GNP. Meanwhile, by 1958 the industrial sector 
only accounted for ten percent of GNP, with some 20,000 employees working in 
industries such as flourmills, canning tomatoes, and handicrafts (Joffe & McLachlan, 
1982). 
 
The early 1960s marked a change in Libya’s source of income with petroleum 
accounting for 98.7 percent of exports by late 196320 (Vandewalle, 1998). Between 1964 
and 1966 oil revenues increased between 17 and 29 percent annually - relatively modest 
compared to the 100 percent increases experienced prior to 1964. Moreover, between 
1962 and 1969 national income increased from (Libyan Dinars) LD180 million to LD820 
million, with gross disposable incomes increasing 15 percent annually during the same 
time period (Allan, 1981). Spending oil revenues increased dramatically between 1963 
and 1969, with all sectors such as housing, transportation, communication, health, and 
education reaping the benefits. The substantial capital inflows impacted all levels of 
society increasing the standard of living and nurturing entrepreneurial and employment 
                                                 
18 Oil exploration began in Libya in 1955. In 1959 American prospectors confirmed commercially viable 
quantities at Amal and Zelten, separate oilfields in Cyrenaica (St John, 2008, p. 121). 
19 Aside from foreign aid and rental income, the other major sources of revenue consisted of the sale of 
scrap metal left behind by the belligerents during the war and esparto grass used in craftwork (Anderson, 
1986a, p. 67; Vandewalle, 1995, p. 5). 
20 The production of oil climbed from 20,000 barrels per day in 1960 to almost 3 million barrels in 
September 1969 (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 63). 
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opportunities unparalleled in Libya’s economic history (Allen, 1981). In addition to 
enriching the government, the accumulation of substantial oil revenues precipitated 
enormous strains on the traditional administrative and cultural fabric of Libyan society, 
where a politically awakened populace demanded change that the monarchy appeared 
unwilling or unable to accommodate (St John, 2008; St John, 2011). 
 
During the first decade of independence the monarchy overwhelmingly relied on kinship 
for economic distribution, creating a domestic political economy in which public 
administration and private interests were virtually indistinguishable (Anderson, 1986b; 
Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998). However, with the commercialisation of oil in the 
early 1960s Libya changed from a poor desert economy to a super-affluent one, 
becoming the fourth largest oil exporter toward the end of the decade (Naur, 1986; St 
John, 2008). Rapid economic growth began to undermine the king’s reliance on kinship 
to distribute the country’s resources and as a source of political power, but needing to 
maintain political quiescence the monarchy turned toward large-scale patronage and 
distributive measures (Vandewalle, 1995). Recruitment to distributive outlets followed 
the traditional pattern of kinship alliance, with tribal leaders (particularly in Cyrenaica), 
the royal diwan, and Sanusiya family members collectively controlling the economic 
bureaucracy - a bureaucracy corrupted by the inundation of oil wealth (El Fathaly & 
Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 1998; St John, 2008). 
 
For politically disenfranchised Libyans, the monarchy’s main attraction was its role as 
the purveyor of economic handouts, but the growing economic disparities between the 
provinces and among individuals unleased social tensions and divided loyalties. The 
monarchy’s resistance to modernizing Libya’s human and material resources, or any 
serious attempt to broaden its political base, fuelled demands for social and political 
change (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2008; St John, 2011). 
By the end of the 1960s many Libyans concluded that Idris’ policies were parochial, if 
not corrupt and had to be changed, but without a galvanizing national ideology with 
which to express collective dissent Libyans turned to the nascent forces of Arab 
nationalism (St John, 2008; St John, 2011). Corruption had devalued the king’s religious 
legitimacy, with authority now resting on economic largesse - albeit unevenly distributed 
(Anderson, 1986a). In Gramsci terms, because political society had not adjusted civil 
society to the new economic structure, rule through hegemony was denied with coercive 
force lingering in the background should economic consent fail. 
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Qadhafi’s 1969 revolution 
On 1 September 1969 The Free Officers’ Movement headed by a twelve-member 
directorate the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) with Muammar Qadhafi as 
leader, carried out a bloodless coup overthrowing the Sanusiya monarchy21 (Naur, 1986). 
With Libyans deeply dissatisfied with the corruption and mismanagement of the 
monarchy - eager for change, and hungry for ideological fulfilment, the ‘One September 
Revolution’ was received by a wave of spontaneous support, albeit out of the desire for 
change, rather than specific support for Qadhafi (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Harris, 
1986; St John, 2011). Vandewalle (1995) argues that many Libyans remained apathetic, 
having little interest in the revolutionaries beyond their ability to distribute the revenues 
of an oil state. The monarchy’s authority had been established on the historical traditions 
of tribe and Islam, but neither Qadhafi nor the RCC could claim any such legitimacy 
coming from less prestigious tribes marginalized under the monarchy22 (First, 1974; 
Vandewalle, 2008; St John, 2011). As Al-Werfalli (2011) states, where traditional or 
rational-legal authority is absent, charismatic legitimacy provides an alternative, often 
utilised as a coping mechanism when traditional societies breakdown. 
 
Without any traditional authority Qadhafi set about establishing his charismatic 
credentials with his youth, down-to-earth manner, and religious devoutness proving 
advantageous (El-Kikhia, 1997; Vandewalle, 2008). Additionally, being neither 
Cyrenaican nor Tripolitanian but a Bedouin from Sirte made him an ideal leader for the 
rival regions, with his humble origins rallying the respect and support of the minor tribes 
(Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006). Moreover, the new regime’s major platforms of Arab 
nationalism, opposition to colonialism and imperialism, and a commitment to Islam 
ingratiated these young revolutionaries to the Libyan people (Bearman, 1986; Harris, 
1986). As to whether Qadhafi’s charisma, which had proven the most powerful 
psychological mechanism (what Sharp terms an intangible factor) of consent during the 
first years of the revolution, could be transformed into a unifying ideology to penetrate 
                                                 
21 At the time of the 1969 coup, King Idris was abroad for medical treatment. Idris eventually settled in 
Egypt, living in exile in Cairo until his death on 25 May 1983 aged 94 (St John, 2011, p. 47). 
22 Only two of the twelve-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) came from major tribes, and one 
came from a privileged background. Mgarief was a member of the Sa’adi tribe the al-Magharba and Yunis 
belonged to an important tribe from the Augila oasis in Chad. Meheishy was born of a Misuratan father 
who was a provincial notable (First, 1974, p. 115). 
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the structure and superstructure to establish hegemony remained to be seen (El Fathaly & 
Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 2008). 
 
Colonel Qadhafi inherited a state based on a religious foundation in which Islam featured 
as the central political ideology, so to ensure the regime’s survival and success the new 
leadership identified with Islam to legitimise its actions23 (Allen, 1981; Anderson, 1983; 
Takeyh, 2000). Apart from Qadhafi’s personal commitment to Islam, Islamic rhetoric 
was employed to undermine the religious authority that had sustained the monarchy, and 
to establish the new regime’s own religious credentials (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; 
Anderson, 1986b; Vandewalle, 1995). The ulama more than any other group in a Muslim 
country have the power to influence public opinion and legitimise the actions of a ruler, 
and given Qadhafi lacked the social prestige of the previous elite he set about forging an 
alliance with the orthodox non-Sanusiya ulama not accorded power under the monarchy 
(Takeyh, 2000; Gibrell, 2001). 
 
The orthodox religious establishment, enjoying an improved status under Qadhafi, 
allowed themselves to be used as a source of legitimacy during the early years of the 
revolution; it was through religious authority that Qadhafi reintroduced sharia law as the 
basis of the Libyan legal code (Anderson, 1983). However, when the jurisprudence of the 
orthodox ulama interfered with Qadhafi’s increasingly idiosyncratic interpretation of 
Islam, he discarded them as a source of legitimacy (Anderson, 1983; Harris, 1986). To 
emphasise the revolutionary regime’s Islamic status acceptable religious activities were 
also redefined, with the consumption of alcohol and any public entertainment considered 
pornographic or obscene banned (St John, 1983; Anderson, 1986b). By the mid-1970s, 
Qadhafi had consolidated authority by coopting Islam’s historical legitimacy as an 
organic superstructure and intangible source of political power. 
 
Part of Qadhafi’s initial popular appeal was his commitment to Arab nationalism and 
discarding the vestiges of colonialism and imperialism that had long suppressed Libya24. 
                                                 
23 The Qadadfa tribe of which Qadhafi was a member was a saintly (murabit) though not noble or wealthy 
tribe, said to be descendants of the Prophet. Although proud of his tribal origins, Qadhafi made no claim to 
a special religious charisma to justify the regime’s accession to power (Anderson, 1983, p. 138). 
24 The 1969 revolution generation had grown up during a period in Arab history marked by numerous 
tumultuous events: the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine; the Egyptian Revolution and Nasser’s 
ascent to power, the Algerian war of liberation; a succession of military coups in Syria; the overthrow of 
the monarchy in Iraq; the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the tripartite invasion of Egypt (Al-
Werfalli, 2011, p. 16). 
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Qadhafi and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) garnered considerable support 
by creating a sense of political allegiance among Libyans – drawing on Libya’s history of 
anticolonial resistance and presenting themselves as heirs to colonial hero al-Mukhtar  
(Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 2008; Ahmida, 2009). Qadhafi’s early action in successfully 
negotiating evacuation of British and American military bases, symbolic of foreign 
domination, was regarded heroic and miraculous against what many Libyans believed 
were omnipotent nations, winning the regime mass support25 (El-Fathaly & Palmer, 
1980; Ahmida, 2009; Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
 
On 21 July 1970, Qadhafi announced that prime agricultural, business and other 
properties owned by Italians, a major source of contention among Libyans, were to be 
confiscated and restored to the Libyan people. Additionally, Libyan citizenship was 
denied to Italians forcing their repatriation to Italy (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). Within 
three months of Qadhafi’s proclamation up to 20,000 Italians had departed, relinquishing 
21,000 hectares of farming land, 1700 properties, and approximately LD9 million in 
frozen funds – Qadhafi had successfully removed a perceived threat to the revolution and 
created a nationalistic charisma around his person26 (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; 
Bearman, 1986; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Moreover, Italian place and street names were 
changed into Arabic, Italian churches were closed or turned into mosques, with all 
foreign passports translated into Arabic (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Bearman, 1986; St 
John, 2011). 
 
With growing claims for Arab nationalism these symbolic acts of national independence 
and the glorification of Libya’s Arab history and culture enhanced the regime’s 
legitimacy while establishing Qadhafi’s credentials as a future leader of the Arab 
revolution27. Nevertheless, in a Gramscian sense, while Arab nationalism provided the 
regime with a superstructure of consent, the consensual nature of pan-Arabism was more 
                                                 
25 In the mid-1960s, being more economically independent and with the appeal of Arab nationalism 
conflicting with the monarchy’s pro-Western stance, plans were already underway to evacuate the United 
States and British military bases (Harris, 1986, p. 12). The British evacuated Al-Adem Base on 28 March 
1970 and the Americans left Wheelus Air Base on 11 June 1970, after which these two dates became 
official holidays commemorated annually in popular festivities (St John, 1983, p. 474). 
26 7 October was proclaimed a national holiday marking the date in 1970 that Italian-owned assets were 
confiscated and all remaining Italians expelled (St John, 1983, p. 474). 
27 The blessing of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, the preeminent national hero to Libyan youth, 
enhanced Colonel Qadhafi’s aura of strength and sanctity. After Nasser’s death in 1970, Qadhafi enhanced 
his charismatic credentials by claiming to be Nasser’s legitimate heir of the Arab revolution (Al-Werfalli, 
2011, p. 26). 
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in response to the prevailing circumstances rather than being an organic phenomenon – 
this is supported by Qadhafi’s recognition of the futility of Arab nationalism, which he 
abandoned in the late 1990s to instead pursue pan-Africanism (St John, 2011). 
 
Qadhafi’s charismatic figure was further reinforced when he seemingly single-handedly 
forced a revision of world oil prices in the early 1970s (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). The 
monarchy’s 1955 petroleum law entrusted the entire economic development of Libyan 
oil to multinational oil companies, leaving the government to simply collect its 50 
percent share of net revenues; this arrangement led to the production of too much, too 
fast, threatening the long-term health of Libyan oil fields (Allan, 1981; St John, 2011). 
The oil companies’ monopoly over Libya’s oil industry came to an end when Qadhafi 
and the RCC moved to assert domestic control and increased the posted price of oil 
(Ahmida, 2009; St John, 2011). 
 
The revolutionary regime’s conservation policy forced a reduction in the production of 
oil by 40 percent between 1970 and 1972, adversely affecting independent oil companies 
(Allan, 1981). Occidental were most vulnerable to the conservation policy, with no other 
oil reserves outside Libya, they were forced to accept the May 1970 cut in production of 
400,000 barrels per day (bpd) and an increase of $0.30 per barrel in the posted price of 
crude oil (Allan, 1981; St John, 2011).  In the same year cuts of around 125,000 bpd 
were levelled at other independents, with the RCC eventually cutting oil companies’ 
collective production by 800,000 bpd while increasing the price per barrel; this hardline 
policy ended the myth that only oil producers could set the posted price of oil (Allen, 
1981; St John, 2011). 
 
Reduced production had an immediate impact on world markets – in Libya the higher 
prices sustained or increased revenues while oil reserves were conserved (Allan, 1981). 
Qadhafi’s successful negotiations raised Libya’s crude oil to one of the highest-priced 
among the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) members; from 
1972 OPEC controlled price-setting with Libya simply ensuring its prices were 
competitive with other producers28 (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Qadhafi consolidated his 
                                                 
28 Libya’s oil revenues for the fiscal year 1970-71 were LD 469 million, in 1971-72 revenues rose to LD 
652 million, and then levelled at LD 646 million in 1972-73 but escalated with the rest of OPC in 1974 
after the October 1973 crisis (Allan, 1981, pp. 184-185). 
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authority over Libya’s major material resource, one of Sharp’s six sources of political 
power, which he would use to procure consent for his leadership.   
 
With Libyans already accustomed to the workings of a distributive state, the 
revolutionary regime applied the strategy of buying support by extending Libya’s 
national prosperity to all sectors of society (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Libya became a land of 
free social services offering healthcare, education, childcare, and unemployment 
compensation, which enjoyed widespread support (Harris, 1986; St John, 2011). Though 
official policy advocated a socialist economic system the revolutionary regime 
encouraged and subsidized capitalist ventures from 1969 to 1973 (St John, 1983). 
Farmers could purchase land taking on mortgages for only 10 percent of the estimated 
value, while receiving a government salary until the land yielded returns (El Fathaly & 
Palmer). Additionally, small businesses flourished with the adoption of a ‘Libya first’ 
policy in which Libyan firms were granted all government contracts (Vandewalle, 1998). 
Government finance was also available to establish commercial enterprises with 95-100 
percent of initial capital loaned (Allan, 1981). 
 
The economic initiatives adopted by the regime provided a direct economic stake in the 
revolution to a broad section of the population, winning the regime a tentative level of 
support. However, it would not provide the long-lasting support needed for political 
legitimacy (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Qadhafi’s support of 
capitalist enterprises secured a base of support for the regime, but when the socialist 
revolution was unleased in the mid-1970s Qadhafi condemned capitalism and the groups 
that had brought him some legitimacy (Vandewalle, 1998; St John, 2011). Qadhafi’s 
intangible mixture of charismatic, historical, symbolic, and cultural elements resonated 
among the Libyan population giving him a degree of authority. Nevertheless, to ensure 
the longevity of the regime and achieve hegemony in the true Gramscian sense, Qadhafi 
would need to achieve ideological consensus within the political and civil superstructures 
of Libyan society, the alternative being rule through domination.  
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Chapter Three:  The green shadow of domination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chapter aims to examine the reality of Sharp’s theory that consent (regardless of 
whether it is ‘free’ or ‘intimidated’ consent) remains the basis of political power. Sharp’s 
assertion will be challenged by incorporating both Gramsci’s assumption that where 
‘spontaneous’ consent fails the state will rule through domination, and Scott’s public-
private transcript theory that seeming consent in the public discourse can disguise 
resistance to domination in the private transcript. To adequately convey the complexity 
of the Libyan state apparatus this chapter will trace the revolutionary regime’s initial 
attempts at political consolidation and mobilization, examine the formal and informal 
political structures, and use of material resources to pursue a socialist economy. While 
this chapter is relatively detailed and descriptive, this approach was necessary to 
sufficiently demonstrate the revolutionary regime’s successive failures to win consent, 
which ultimately resulted in rule through coercion, fragmentation and force. 
 
Political consolidation and mobilization 
To reduce the potential counter-revolutionary influence of the tribes and tribal sections 
that had prospered under the monarchy, in November 1970 Qadhafi abolished the tribes’ 
legal authority and reconfigured the traditional administrative boundaries into mixed 
tribal zones (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; St John, 2011). Moreover, local officials were 
dismissed and replaced by new local administrators typically from less prestigious tribes 
whose origins were more congenial with those of the Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC) (Obeidi, 2001). To fill the void left by the abolition of the tribal system, Colonel 
Qadhafi established the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) on 12 June 1971 as the sole political 
party in Libya, to serve as the primary link between the people and the regime29 
(Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2011). Thus Qadhafi abandoned the tribe 
as an historical superstructure of consent through which ideologies were disseminated, 
                                                 
29 Law Number 71 of 30 May 1972 stipulated that anyone who created a political party or was involved in 
political activity outside the ASU would be subject to the death penalty (First, 1974, p. 133; Vandewalle, 
2006, p. 83). 
“You should understand that since 1977 we no longer have any constitutional 
prerogative…You may seek our advice; we are ready to play the role of revolutionary 
instigators…However, we are restricted by people’s authority…People’s authority has 
become restrictive even on revolutionaries…it restricts even Mu’ammar al-Qadhdhafi; 
I cannot act” 
(Cited in Vandewalle, 2006, p. 120) 
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and arbitrarily established a single political institution to instil revolutionary ideology; as 
Gramsci asserts, where ideology is arbitrarily applied its longevity will be limited 
(Forgacs, 1999). 
 
The structure of the ASU made it less a popular political movement than a parallel 
administrative structure to the RCC machinery; it suffered from the inherent conflict of 
representing both the regime’s interests and local concerns30 (Obeidi, 2001). The RCC 
rigidly controlled the ASU ensuring bureaucratic remnants of the monarchy were 
replaced with its own modernising adherents, although they proved mainly apolitical. By 
centralising decision-making power in the ASU the RCC stifled local initiative that 
conflicted with the RCC’s goals; and squashed any re-emergence of tribal solidarities – a 
task that proved more arduous than expected (First, 1974; Vandewalle, 2006). With the 
scope and activities of the ASU closely circumscribed by the RCC, the ASU lacked the 
legitimacy to mobilise Libyans toward political participation (Vandewalle, 1998; Obeidi, 
2001; St John, 2011). El Fathaly and Palmer (1980) argue that the dismal membership 
record of the ASU reflected the average Libyans political apathy, along with an active 
boycott by traditional tribal and religious leaders. In Sharp’s terms Qadhafi’s regime was 
unable to procure authority and human resources as sources of political power, instead 
using coercion and veto to enforce political legitimacy. While organic superstructures of 
consent (which Qadhafi had abandoned or was in the process of discarding) in the tribe 
and Islam continued to influence the political landscape. 
 
Dissatisfied with the performance of the ASU, Colonel Qadhafi decided on a more 
radical strategy of bottom-up mobilisation to encourage political participation 
(Vandewalle, 2008). On 15 April 1973 Qadhafi proclaimed the ‘Popular or Cultural 
Revolution’ where he announced a five-point program to breakdown the residual power 
of the old bureaucracy and replace them with popularly elected people’s committees 
(PCs) serving as subordinate local branches of the national ASU (Joffe & McLachlan, 
1982; Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006; Obeidi, 2001). Libyans received Qadhafi’s 
declaration reluctantly; unconvinced the administration could be changed from the 
bottom-up. However, after initial hesitation some workers and students established PCs 
in their place of work or study, displacing the modernising administrators appointed by 
                                                 
30 The ASU consisted of three basic tiers: local, provincial, and national assemblies. Representatives met 
once every four months at the General Congress being the highest authority of the ASU, where the RCC 
occupied the position of executive committee (Vandewalle, 1998, p. 67; Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 29). 
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the RCC31 (Al-Werfalli, 2011; St John, 2011). While committee elections often resulted 
in the re-empowerment of the same traditional patron-figures Qadhafi sought to 
marginalise, the RCC often intervened by appointing loyal supporters from the lower 
classes who were considered more closely aligned with the masses. This often filled 
committees with unqualified members, without appropriate administrative and 
managerial skills (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; El-Kikhia, 1997; Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
 
Much like the ASU, the people’s committees system failed to generate spontaneous 
popular participation, with most Libyans remaining indifferent to Qadhafi’s system of 
popular democracy (Bearman, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995). Colonel Qadhafi criticised the 
population’s resistance to people’s committees as undermining the goals of the 
revolution, but for the Libyan people the ostensibly democratic committee system was 
merely cosmetic, with real authority vested in the Libyan leader (Allan, 1981). In terms 
of Scott’s framework despite the veneer of popular rule in the public transcript the RCC 
remained firmly in control, with the non-participation of the population an expression of 
their private transcript of opposition. The bifurcation of the formal 
political/administrative institutions and extra-legal revolutionary mechanisms of political 
control became an enduring feature of Libyan political life through to the present day 
(Vandewalle, 2006). 
 
The breakdown of religious and revolutionary legitimacy 
Qadhafi’s confrontation with the ulama began in the early 1970s with the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ that sought to replace all existing laws with sharia law, and intensified with 
the publication of part one and two of the Green Book over the mid-to-late 1970s32 33 
(Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 1998). The ulama have substantial power in traditional 
Islamic societies, being entrusted with the interpretation and administration of sharia, but 
their status remains dependent on the government’s attitude toward Islam (Gibrell, 2001). 
In Qadhafi’s desire to reform the legal system he attacked Islamic jurisprudence based on 
two orthodox Sunni doctrines, the hadith and sunna, as being contrary to the 
                                                 
31 After the 1979 split between political and revolutionary authority, the people’s committees remained as 
administrative units to implement the decisions of the new political structures, the General People’s 
Congress and the Basic People’s Congresses (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 191). 
32 Under the monarchy the legal system was essentially secular with sharia law only used to deal with 
personal matters (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 146). 
33 The Green Book is Qadhafi’s ideological primer for Libya’s economic, political, and social structures 
based on direct democracy, that is, rule by the people not by representation (Ayoub, 1987, p. 35). 
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revolutionary spirit of Islam embodied in Qadhafi’s ‘Third Universal Theory’34 
(Anderson, 1983; Naur, 1986). Qadhafi demanded the Quran serve as the exclusive 
source of religious inspiration and for direct communication between the individual and 
God, not through intermediaries such as the ulama (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; 
Vandewalle, 1995). Qadhafi stripped the traditional religious establishment of its power 
making them consultants of the courts rather than arbiters of sharia (St John, 2011). 
Religion had served as a strong basis for Qadhafi’s original legitimacy, but in alienating 
the religious establishment the Libyan leader undermined two sources of political power 
as proposed by Sharp - intangible factors and authority. 
 
The release of the Green Book exacerbated tensions between Qadhafi and the ulama, 
with the latter arguing that its socialist prescriptions conflicted with the principles of 
Islamic law which sanctioned capitalist ideas including private property rights and 
inheritance35 (Allan, 1981; Vandewalle, 1998; Takeyh, 2000). In response to the 
criticism of the Green Book Qadhafi strongly attacked the religious scholars, describing 
them as a reactionary group who distorted Islam (Deeb & Deeb, 1982; Bearman, 1986; 
Harris, 1986). Again, Qadhafi abandoned a historical superstructure of consent, 
supplanting it with his own arbitrary religious doctrine. The Libyan population found 
Qadhafi’s radical interpretation of Islam disturbing, thus he forfeited his legitimacy as a 
representative of Islam as a superstructural node of spontaneous consent, instead 
becoming the unifying ideology of the Libyan opposition. Nevertheless, Qadhafi did not 
surrender religious legitimacy, regarding the Green Book as the new gospel (Anderson, 
1983; Takeyh, 2000).  
 
The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) seemingly brought to power a group of 
military men who agreed on the political direction for Libya. In the early days of the 
revolution the RCC assumed both executive and legislative functions, and although 
Qadhafi was clearly the final arbiter in all decisions every RCC member had some 
                                                 
34 Qadhafi has insisted that the Third Universal Theory (TUT) is a common-sense interpretation of Islam. 
The TUT was not meant to supplant Islam but instil a new set of laws based on a reinterpretation of the 
Quran from which all humankind could benefit. The TUT is explained in the Green Book as an alternative 
to capitalism and communism (Anderson, 1983, p. 147; St John, 1983, pp. 475-476; Ayoub, 1987, pp. 35, 
87; Takeyh, 2000, p. 156).  
35 The ulama’s argument over Quranic interpretations of private property was also motivated in defence of 
their waqf, property alienated for the purpose of religious endowment and exempt from traditional 
inheritance law and taxation, and the major revenue source of the religious establishment. The socialist 
economic reforms effectively nationalised waqf (Bearman, 1986, p. 162; Vandewalle, 1995, pp. 148, 150). 
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authority over Libya’s political and economic life (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Joffe & 
McLachlan, 1982; Obeidi, 2001). Qadhafi dominated the RCC as both a leader and a 
psychological guide for its members. Individually, RCC members could not censure the 
Colonel but their collective weight placed a restraint on his behaviour (Joffe & 
McLachlan, 1982). Behind this facade of cohesion, the RCC split into two distinct 
factions: technocrats argued for orderly, well-planned economic and political 
modernisation; while revolutionaries sought activist policies sacrificing oil revenues for 
Arab unity and other ideological pursuits, with Qadhafi himself seeing Arab unity as the 
uncontested objective of the revolution (Vandewalle, 1998; Vandewalle, 2008). In 
Scott’s terms, the RCC’s initial public appearance of cohesion belied a private realm in 
which consent did not underlie their relationship. 
 
As Qadhafi’s power ascended he became less willing to share collegial authority with the 
RCC, and his determination to impose his own vision led to intense conflict manifesting 
in a failed coup from within the RCC in August 197536 37 (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; El-
Kikhia, 1997). In the wake of the coup Libya’s technocrats were defeated, clearing the 
way for Qadhafi to implement his vision of a stateless society. The failed coup attempt 
reinforced Qadhafi’s consolidation of personal control and led to his Declaration of the 
Authority of the People on 2 March 1977, creating the Socialist People’s Arab 
Jamahiriyya – displacing the RCC and ASU with a new committee system (outlined in 
the Green Book) as the core political institutions of the revolution38 (Joffe & McLachlan, 
1982; Obeidi, 2001). Qadhafi had failed to procure ideological consensus from all RCC 
members at Gramsci’s superstructural level but had instead asserted his position of 
dominance.  
 
Protecting the regime: formal and informal means of power and control 
Following the declaration of people’s authority, political control was vested in Basic 
People’s Congresses (BPCs) that had gradually replaced the ASU local committees since 
                                                 
36 The 1975 coup arose over intense policy conflict between Qadhafi and a coalition of RCC members 
centered around Bashir Hawadi (Chairman of the ASU) and Umar al-Muhayshi (Minister of Planning), in 
which the disaffected RCC members accused Qadhafi of monopolizing power at the expense of the RCC. 
In December 1969, a coup was instigated by two free officers occupying the positions of minister of 
defence and minister of the interior who rejected Qadhafi’s revolutionist vision; both were arrested and 
charged (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980, p. 47; Bearman, 1986, p. 148; Vandewalle, 2008, p. 18). 
37 See Appendix A for the composition of the RCC from 1969 to 1975. 
38 In place of the RCC, Qadhafi created the General Secretariat of the General People’s Congress, which he 
filled with former RCC members with himself as Chairman of the body (El-Kikhia, 1997, p. 54; 
Vandewalle, 2008, p. 62). 
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1975 (with the older people’s committees as their executive branch), as well as trade 
unions, professional associations, and the General People’s Congress (GPC, which will 
be discussed shortly)39 (Vandewalle, 1998; Obeidi, 2001; Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
Theoretically, the BPCs were the main decision-making institutions through which 
people were involved in the political process at the grass-roots level, where the people 
alone were to exercise authority in decision-making – but the reality was, as Qadhafi 
acknowledged in the Green Book, “theoretically, this is genuine democracy but 
realistically, the strong always rule i.e. the stronger party in the society is the one that 
rules” (Qaddafi, 1980, p. 53). Thus the formal political system of popular rule became a 
façade behind which Qadhafi and a narrow circle of intimates had ultimate power40 
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 2011a).  
 
In principle, attendance at BPCs was compulsory but despite good attendance during the 
early years abstention became the predominate posture (Al-Werfalli, 2011; ICG, 2011a). 
Al-Werfalli’s (2011) study found that high attendance during the early years did not stem 
from an ideological sense of duty but rather in response to threats that non-attendees 
would have no recourse against BPC decisions. Moreover, Al-Werfalli (2011) found 
increased use of force accounted for a rise in involuntary attendees too fearful not to 
attend. Qadhafi resorted to ‘guided democracy’ in which revolutionary committees (RC) 
forced attendance where a lack of revolutionary ideological consensus prevailed (Harris, 
1986). More than half of the participants in Al-Werfalli’s research that attended BPCs 
did so in response to a potential or direct threat, with the inclination to show false 
compliance the predominant attitude (Al-Werfalli, 2011). While many Libyans may have 
privately deplored Qadhafi’s revolutionary ideology, they rarely expressed dissent in 
public demonstrations (Harris, 1986). As Scott (1990) argues, a regime’s control of the 
public transcript can provide a convincing façade of hegemony, but revealing the private 
transcript of subordinates – as Al-Werfalli does – can clarify the situation as one of 
domination. 
                                                 
39 All citizens over eighteen years of age registered as members of the BPC in their area, and based on 
professional and functional categories established themselves into trade unions and professional 
associations that operate within the congress/committee system of the Jamahiriyya. Records indicate there 
have been between 400-600 BPCs all of which operate in isolation from one another (Joffe & McLachlan, 
1982, p. 243; Obeidi, 2001, pp. 142-143; Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 35; ICG, 2011a, p. 9). 
40 Since the creation of the BPC system, the only change to the formal political system occurred in October 
1998 with the creation of 26 regional units known as sha’abiyat positioned between the BPC and GPC, 
each with its own people’s congress and people’s committee with their task to improve the coordination of 
local interests an decentralize authority (St John, 2011, p. 76). 
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The official separation between political and revolutionary authority was declared at the 
General People’s Congress (GPC) on 2 March 1979 and henceforth the GPC seemingly 
replaced the RCC as the highest decision-making authority in Libya41 (Naur, 1986; 
Vandewalle, 1995). To further emphasise the distinction between political and 
revolutionary authority, Colonel Qadhafi and former RCC members relinquished their 
roles as members of the GPC General Secretariat to focus solely on revolutionary 
activities, with all top positions within the formal political structure becoming civilian42 
(Vandewalle, 2008; Al-Werfalli, 2011). The GPC was the Libyan equivalent of 
Parliament, headed by a Secretary and composed of the secretaries of the BPCs, people’s 
committees, the unions, and professional associations in total comprised of around 1,000 
delegates who turned local decisions into national resolutions43 (Obeidi, 2001). 
 
The GPC was charged with appointing secretaries (ministers) to the General People’s 
Committee (cabinet) as the highest executive authority headed by a Secretary General 
(prime minister), and elected a five-member General Secretariat. The General Secretariat 
was responsible for organising the annual two-week long meeting of the GPC, preparing 
the GPC’s agenda by soliciting and reviewing GPC delegates’ comments, and 
undertaking functions normally reserved for the head of state (Vandewalle, 2008; Al-
Werfalli, 2011). In theory the GPC had the power to discuss and criticize government 
institutions and issue decrees with the force of law, but in reality it was simply a vehicle 
through which the Colonel’s decisions were ratified (Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
 
The twenty secretaries of the General People’s Committee were nominated by the 
Revolutionary Committees Liaison Bureau (RCLB, to be discussed below), endorsed by 
Qadhafi; with the predetermined choices ratified through the GPC electoral process 
(Allan, 1981; Obeidi, 2001; Al-Werfalli, 2011). While the General People’s Committee 
had to explain their policies to the GPC when requested, it did not take orders from GPC 
delegates who were simply messengers of their respective BPC (Joffe & McLachlan, 
1982). The participants in Al-Werfalli’s study overwhelmingly mistrusted the GPC and 
                                                 
41 In January 1976, the ASU Congress was renamed the General People’s Congress (GPC) to reflect the 
new congress/committee system (Bearman, 1986, p. 149; Vandewalle, 1998, p. 96). 
42 From March 1979 Colonel Qadhafi never again occupied any formal political position with his post 
stationed above the political fray in the role of ‘Leader or Guide of the Revolution’ (Joffe & McLachlan, 
1982, p. 243; Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 35). 
43 See Appendix B for a diagram of the structure of the people’s authority system. 
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the General People’s Committee perceiving these governmental bodies as unreliable, 
given regime loyalty was the basis for appointment (Al-Werfalli, 2011). For many 
Libyans, these political institutions were the domain of regime stalwarts, and nothing 
more than talking shops tasked with implementing arbitrary decisions made by Qadhafi 
(ICG, 2011a). In a Gramscian sense the Colonel arbitrarily imposed the GPC on the 
Libyan population, and while the GPC publicly purported to be an institution of 
collaborative and consensual decision-making, the private reality was that it served 
Qadhafi and perpetuated his rule through domination. 
 
In accordance with Qadhafi’s Green Book declaration “committees everywhere” 
(Qaddafi, 1980, p. 35) in the late-1970s revolutionary committees (RC) were formed in 
businesses, educational institutions, and the armed forces, with an RC unit built into 
every BPC, people’s committee, professional association, and other state institutions 
(Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995; Obeidi, 2001). The revolutionary committees had two 
main functions: to mobilise the masses toward political participation and to serve as 
watchdogs within the formal political structures to prevent any deviation from 
revolutionary ideology44 (Vandewalle, 1995; El-Kikhia, 1997; Al-Werfalli, 2011). After 
the separation of political and revolutionary authority in March 1979, Qadhafi appointed 
the RCs ‘gatekeepers’ of the BPCs, now considered inefficient and hostile to political 
innovation (Vandewalle, 1995). The RCs monitored BPC agendas; censored proposals 
that conflicted with revolutionary programs and the Green Book; guided elections for the 
leadership of BPCs in which RC members were predominantly recruited; and gathered 
intelligence against enemies of the revolution (Naur, 1986; Obeidi, 2001; Vandewalle, 
2008). In Sharp’s terms, the Libyan leader used the RCs to acquire ‘intimidated’ consent 
where ‘free’ consent was not forthcoming.  
 
Between 1979 and 1987 the revolutionary committees were the single most powerful 
group within Libya, and understanding the allure of power Qadhafi did not permit the 
RCs to organise activities themselves, nor were they allowed to contact one another; all 
RCs reported to the Revolutionary Committees Liaison Bureau (RCLB) held directly 
                                                 
44 In 1979, the Revolutionary Committees established a weekly newspaper entitled al-Zahf al-Akhdar  or 
The Green March, followed in 1980 by al-Jamahiriyya in which newly founded committees were regularly 
announced (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 95; Obeidi, 2001, pp. 145-146). 
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responsible to Qadhafi45 (Vandewalle, 1995; El-Kikhia, 1997; Vandewalle, 1998). 
Nevertheless by December 1988, in the context of growing public dissatisfaction with the 
economy, Qadhafi publicly curtailed the RCs’ role as their continued misuse of power in 
violently pursuing anti-revolutionaries had become counterproductive to encouraging 
meaningful popular participation (Vandewalle, 1995; Obeidi, 2001). However, Qadhafi 
did not abolish the RCs entirely and in the mid-1990s they were rehabilitated to provide 
Qadhafi with moral and physical support against opposition movements (El Kikhia, 
1997; St John, 2011). In May 2002, there were an estimated 60,000 revolutionary 
committee members in Libya (Vandewalle, 2008). With revolutionary ideology proving 
an insufficient mechanism for mobilization, Qadhafi exercised domination over the 
Libyan population through the RCs. As Gramsci asserted, where the creation of genuine 
hegemony fails the state will revert to reliance on its coercive apparatus constructed in 
anticipation when ‘spontaneous’ consent declines (Bates, 1975). 
 
The Revolutionary Committees’ membership was not electorally based but available to 
anyone who believed in the revolutionary ideology codified in Qadhafi’s Green Book 
(Obeidi, 2001). Graduates of political indoctrination camps in which the regime hardcore 
imparted revolutionary knowledge provided initial membership of the RCs, with 
subsequent members undertaking Green Book courses after RC membership was granted 
(Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998). RC members were largely motivated to join by 
ideology, including loyalty to the charismatic figure of Qadhafi, but some members had 
joined opportunistically hoping to improve their economic and social standing (Al-
Werfalli, 2011). Al-Werfalli’s (2011) survey asked respondents to identify if they were 
members of the RCs, given the RC movement was the sole mechanism through which 
individuals were allowed to exercise revolutionary activism (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 94). 
 
The results of Al-Werfalli’s study revealed that 62.3 percent of the population never 
joined the RCs, but of those who did the incentives and benefits attached to RC 
membership was a strong inducement (El-Kikhia, 1997; Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
Furthermore, Al-Werfalli was able to classify RC members into three distinct groups: 
pro-regime wing who supported Qadhafi unconditionally; reform wing forming a small 
proportion of the survey sample, who supported Qadhafi so long as his directives 
                                                 
45 Prior to the RCs curtailment, several members of the Revolutionary Committees Liaision Bureau 
(RCLB) were appointed secretaries (ministers) of the General People’s Committee of the GPC 
(Vandewalle, 1998, p. 102). 
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enhanced ‘direct democracy’; and withdrawal wing who abandoned the RC movement 
because their values conflicted with the revolutionary leadership (Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
Despite pro-regime wing support, the data revealed that pro-regime political activities 
were exceptionally low, with RC support most evident in the BPCs where approximately 
90.6 percent participated occasionally or regularly (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Qadhafi’s 
revolutionary ideology was even unable to fully penetrate the superstructure of his 
supposed adherents, where a performance of consent in the public transcript belied 
opportunistic content in the private transcript.  
 
A socialist economy, economic sanctions and failed reforms  
Guided by the second part of Qadhafi’s Green Book – on the ‘solution to the economic 
problem’ – by the end of the 1970s a socialist transformation had drastically modified 
Libya’s long-standing economic structures (St John, 2011). These socialist developments 
conflicted with Libya’s virtually homogenous commitment to orthodox Islamic values 
(which sanctioned capitalist ideas); replaced by Qadhafi’s own idiosyncratic Islamic 
vision (Vandewalle, 1995). Nevertheless, with Libyans largely depoliticized and passive 
beneficiaries of economic largesse, Qadhafi’s monopoly of oil revenues allowed him to 
pursue ideological economic policies without seeking popular endorsement (Vandewalle, 
1998; Takeyh, 2000; Vandewalle, 2006). Beginning in 1978 a series of socialist reforms 
was initiated starting with Qadhafi’s dictum “no wage-earners, but partners” (Qaddafi, 
1980, p. 66) – encouraging workers to take over the running of their workplaces, with 
some 180 takeovers completed by the end of the year46 (Deeb & Deeb, 1982). Moreover, 
new guidelines for property rights granted ownership of all tenanted properties to their 
occupants – Libyan families thereafter only being allowed to own one house, 
undermining the economic power of real estate investors47 (Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 
1995; Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
 
The demonetisation of banknotes above one Libyan dinar in 1980 successfully 
encouraged those with cash hoards to deposit them in nationalized banks, increasing 
government control over private assets (Allen, 1981). However, the most profound 
                                                 
46 This was a more radical change than the 1973 ‘popular or cultural revolution’ workers take over in 
which workers were eligible to receive a share of annual profits if their enterprise employed more than 10 
workers and if annual profits exceeded LD 4,000 (Deeb & Deeb, 1982, pp. 115-116). 
47 The new owners had to pay a mortgage in monthly instalments constituting only a third of the former 
rent, with former landlords granted compensation payments over a period of years (Deeb & Deeb, 1982, p. 
116).  
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socialist prescription was the elimination of private commerce, wholesale as well as 
retail, being replaced by a centrally controlled economy (St John, 1983; St John, 2011). 
The state owned all banking, insurance and other major services, was in charge of 
agriculture, manufacturing, imports and exports, with state-run supermarkets established 
in 1981 as the sole distribution centres for all basic commodities (Naur, 1986; 
Vandewalle, 1995). These socialist reforms disenfranchised a substantial section of the 
population, particularly the ‘new capitalists’ who prospered under the early days of the 
regime (Deeb & Deeb, 1982; St John, 1983). In Sharp’s terms Qadhafi’s control of the 
country’s material resources provided him with his main source of political power and 
seeming consent, but in a Gramscian sense true hegemony goes beyond consensus of the 
economic structure.  
 
In Qadhafi’s attempt to implement ‘Islamic socialism’ it became evident that Libya’s 
human resources were not being equally developed (Harris, 1986). By 1975 every sector 
of the workforce largely depended on foreign labour, with 58 percent of expatriate 
personnel holding professional and managerial positions, while foreign workers 
comprised 41 percent of the service sector (Bearman, 1986). The oil industry, accounting 
for almost 99 percent of Libya’s capital inflows, only employed one percent of the active 
Libyan population – largely relying on a more technically savvy expatriate workforce. 
Meanwhile the stagnant public sector accounted for 70-75 percent of Libyan employment 
(Allan, 1981; Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006). With the private sector eliminated and the 
State the sole economic provider, the Libyan population was consigned to unproductive, 
rent-seeking activities (Vandewalle, 2006).  
 
In principle the Green Book’s directives entrusted economic authority to the people’s 
congresses and committees, with Qadhafi often stating he was no longer responsible for 
economic decisions, now the people’s responsibility (Vandewalle, 2008). In reality the 
people’s congresses and committees did not seriously debate economic policies but 
served as a facade behind which a handful of officials and technocrats linked to the 
Libyan leader intervened extensively in the economy, making decisions on national 
economic development unobstructed by the purchased passivity of the population 
(Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998; Takeyh, 2000). Qadhafi arbitrarily changed the 
economic structure rendering the Libyan population economically superfluous, and 
although Qadhafi’s control of the country’s main resource purchased behavioural 
compliance it did not convert into ideological consensus. 
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As global oil prices and Libyan exports declined during the 1980s, Libya experienced a 
serious recession that reduced the regime’s ability to purchase popular consent (Takeyh, 
2000; St John, 2011). Libya’s oil revenues dropped from $22 billion in 1980 to $5.4 
billion in 1986, and oil production decreased and steadied at 1.0 million bpd from 1983 
onwards, compared to the previous average of 1.8 million bdp in 198048 (Bearman, 1986; 
Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2011). In response, the regime implemented austerity 
measures that had severe economic consequences. The expulsion of foreign workers 
severely interrupted food supplies and brought the services sector to a screaming halt 
(Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2011). Prices of basic commodities doubled as state-run 
supermarkets suffered endemic shortages, and popular discontent rose as the inefficient 
and corrupt distributive system virtually collapsed (Bearman, 1986; Harris, 1986). While 
some Libyans expressed anger and discontent at the economic turmoil through 
anonymous acts of vandalism, and grumbling, the majority of Libyans accepted their 
reduced economic circumstances with passive anger (Harris, 1986; Al-Werfalli, 2011). 
As Scott asserts, while public grumbling stops short of making an explicit statement of 
opposition, it provides evidence of an individual’s private transcript of dissent without 
provoking retaliation from an authoritarian regime. 
 
The failure of Qadhafi’s distributive policies continued to erode the Libyan leader’s 
legitimacy, but sensitive to increasing internal discontent Qadhafi announced an infitah 
(liberalization) in late 1987, reintroducing private sector initiatives to significantly cut 
state spending (Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 2006). The liberalization attempt proved 
difficult as Libya lacked the necessary institutions of a modern state, neglected in the 
pursuance of ‘statelessness’ (Vandewalle, 1995). In the early 1990s another liberalization 
effort was instigated but was implemented half-heartedly, with most Libyans unwilling 
to participate in an uncertain economic climate where growth only proceeded at 0.8 
percent annually49 (St John, 2011). Qadhafi ruled by purchasing popular compliance but 
                                                 
48 Two factors exacerbated the decline in export earnings: In 1981, Libya’s share of the oil market shrank 
as Libyan crude was priced $4 higher compared to other exporters such as Saudi Arabia which expanded 
production from 8.5 million bpd to 10.3 million bpd creating a glut in the world market (Bearman, 1986, p. 
268). Moreover, the trade sanctions imposed by the United States in March 1982 in response to Qadhafi’s 
alleged support of global terrorism, restricted US companies from exporting Libyan crude oil which 
accounted for 35 percent of Libya’s oil exports, and banned the import of American oil and gas machinery 
to Libya (Bearman, 1986, p. 268; St John, 2011, p. 95). 
49 Adding to Libya’s economic woes, on 15 April 1992 and tightened in November 1993, the United 
Nations imposed sanctions on Libya that included a ban on air links with Libya, an embargo on the sale of 
aircraft, military and petroleum equipment and the freezing of Libyan assets overseas.  The sanctions were 
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with the collapse of the economic structure and failing to institutionalise his socialist 
ideology within the superstructure, Qadhafi predominantly utilised coercion to perpetuate 
his rule with passive anger bubbling away in the private transcript of the Libyan 
population. 
 
The state coercive apparatus 
Gramsci (Bates, 1975) asserts that when ‘organic crisis’ occurs whereby hegemony is 
absent from both the structure and superstructure the dominant group will resort to rule 
through force. In Libya Gramsci’s assertion was validated, as when revolutionary 
hegemony as embodied in the Green Book failed at both levels, the Libyan leader 
prevailed upon a pervasive security apparatus to prolong his rule. The military provided 
the main source of coercive power in the early days but, wanting to counterweight the 
military’s power which represented the most serious threat to Qadhafi’s authority (to be 
discussed in chapter four), the Libyan leader established a multi-layered and overlapping 
network of security organizations that were carefully controlled to limit any vertical or 
lateral bases of oppositional power forming (Vandewalle, 1995; El-Kikhia, 1997; 
Vandewalle, 2006). 
 
The revolutionary committees discussed previously were the embodiment of the regime’s 
coercive apparatus. Particularly throughout the 1980s and 1990s RC members staffing 
revolutionary courts, not bound by the country’s penal code, were involved in numerous 
arrests, tortures and public executions against individuals involved in anti-revolutionary 
activities50 (Vandewalle, 2008; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Although the visible public profile of 
the RCs was curtailed, they remained a core component of Qadhafi’s revolutionary 
apparatus (Vandewalle, 1995). In June 1990 Qadhafi created the People’s Guard as a 
visible deterrent to counter increasing Islamic agitation. In September 1994 the Colonel 
established cleansing or purification committees whose official duties included 
identification and elimination of counterrevolutionaries (St John, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                 
initiated after Libya failed to cooperate with officials investigating the December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 
that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland killing 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground, and nine 
months later the UTA flight 772 that exploded over Niger killing 179 passengers. The sanctions were 
permanently lifted in September 2003 after the trial of the two Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie case had 
concluded (St John, 2011, p. 98). 
50 The RCs were also involved in the killing of dissidents, a spectacular case occurring in 1984 when 
Libyan dissidents peacefully protesting against the Qadhafi regime outside the Libyan People’s Bureau 
(Libyan embassy staffed by RC members) in London were fired upon resulting in several casualties 
including the death of British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher (St John, 2008). 
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Other security institutions included the Military Secret Service, the Jamahiriyya Security 
Organization, the World Centre for the Fight Against Imperialism, Racism and Fascism 
(involved in the persecution of Libyan’s in exile during the 1980s), and the Intelligence 
Bureau of the Leader located within the Bab al-Aziziyya military compound that also 
served as Qadhafi’s residence (Vandewalle, 2006). Beyond these formal security organs 
Qadhafi relied on relatives, members of his tribe (the Qadhafa) and affiliated tribes to fill 
important and sensitive positions to safeguard the Colonel and his regime (El-Kikhia, 
1997; Vandewalle, 2006; ICG, 2011a). The fact that all security sector institutions 
remained outside the Jamahiriyya’s people’s committee and congress system indicated 
that ultimate control remained firmly within Qadhafi’s grip, where domination prevailed 
over consent (Vandewalle, 2006). 
 
Qadhafi’s abandonment of the tribe and Islam as two organic superstructures of consent 
forfeited access to mechanisms of ‘spontaneous’ or ‘free’ consent, with the Colonel 
instead implementing successive arbitrary political institutions that failed to generate 
popular participation. Additionally, the imposition of his Green Book ideology was 
unsuccessful in establishing revolutionary legitimacy at the superstructural level (even 
failing to some degree within the RCC and RCs, which embodied revolutionary 
authority). Nevertheless, access to substantial capital inflows enabled the Libyan leader 
to purchase the Libyan population’s political acquiescence (although this proved more 
difficult during a recession and under sanctions), which along with coercion and force 
produced a façade of behavioural compliance and seeming hegemony in the public 
transcript. In Sharp’s terms this would be considered ‘intimidated’ consent, while 
Gramsci would argue that the state was ruling through domination given ‘spontaneous’ 
consent had failed. While overt expressions of opposition by the Libyan population were 
minimal thus supporting a public transcript of hegemony, this apparent consent belied a 
private transcript in which Libyans’ passive anger was injected into the public transcript 
in the form of non-participation or anonymous acts of opposition, challenging the picture 
of hegemony into one of resistance to domination as suspected by Scott. 
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Chapter Four:  The 2011 revolution - a search for the sources of violence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That Libyans chose 17 February 2011 as their ‘Day of Rage’ was not just a reaction to 
the prevailing events in North Africa in which long-standing dictatorships in Tunisia and 
Egypt were overthrown51. The date marked the fifth anniversary of a brutal crackdown 
on a public protest in Benghazi in 2006 (Amnesty International [AI], 2011). This chapter 
brings together the analysis of the deep historical superstructures of consent, specifically 
the tribe and Islam, and the examination of Qadhafi’s policies of rule through 
domination, having failed to capitalise on organic consensual superstructures or imbed 
revolutionary legitimacy. These elements will be discussed within the context of Libya’s 
recent history and the events of the 2011 uprising to explain why violent rebellion 
against the regime arose, and how these factors precluded nonviolent action in the way 
Gene Sharp advocates. 
 
Recent events leading to the 2011 revolution 
On 17 February 2006 a crowd of 1,000 protesters set fire to the Italian consulate in Libya 
protesting against Italian minister Roberto Calderoli for wearing a t-shirt displaying a 
Danish cartoon satirising the Prophet Muhammad, originally published in September 
2005 (BBC, 18 February 2006; St John, 2008; Christian Science Monitor [CSM], 17 
February 2011). The International Crisis Group (2011a) suggests that the originally 
regime-orchestrated demonstration against the cartoon turned into an anti-regime protest, 
while Amnesty International (2011) maintain that the violence was simply anger about 
the cartoon, rather than being against Qadhafi. Nevertheless, Libyan security forces 
deployed to suppress the violence, killing at least 12 protesters (AI, 2011; BBC, 18 
February 2006; CSM, 17 February 2011). As usual, the Qadhafi government held nobody 
responsible for the protesters deaths, with any criticism of security forces silenced (AI, 
                                                 
51 On 1 February 2011, Jamal al-Hajii, a Libyan writer and political commentator imprisoned by the regime 
in 2009 and 2010, was arrested by Qadhafi’s security forces over an alleged car accident but is believed to 
have been in relation to his calls for peaceful demonstrations to take place in Libya similar to the recent 
protests in Tunisia and Egypt (Amnesty International News, 5 February 2011; Amnesty International 
News, 8 February 2011). 
 
“He will never let go of his power,” said one, Abdel Rahman. “This is 
a dictator, an emperor. He will die before he gives an inch. But we are 
no longer afraid. We are ready to die after what we have seen” 
 
(Cited in New York Times, 21 February 2011) 
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2011). The following year the regime became aware of demonstrations planned for the 
anniversary, they thus banned all gatherings without regime approval, arresting, 
detaining incommunicado, and eventually sentencing the activists to prison terms ranging 
from six to 25 years for attempting to overthrow the political system (AI, 2011). For the 
International Crisis Group (2011b) Benghazi’s tradition of activism, which had 
resurfaced during the 2006 anti-cartoon protests, made it a natural epicentre for the 2011 
uprising. 
 
Despite the Libyan population’s catalogue of grievances it was a group called the Abu 
Salim Families, relatives of victims of the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre, which 
sparked the 2011 uprising (Amnesty International News [AIN], 16 February 2011). On 
28 June 1996 guards at Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison (notorious for holding opposition 
activists) fired on inmates protesting poor living conditions, killing over a dozen and 
wounding several more (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2003). Top security officials, 
including Qadhafi’s brother-in-law Abdullah Sanussi, ordered a ceasefire and opened 
negotiations while dead prisoners were removed and the injured supposedly taken to 
hospital (HRW, 2003; AIN, 26 September 2011). Instead, the injured were probably 
executed, and the following morning prisoners were forced into the courtyards where 
guards killed an estimated 1,200 of the prison’s 1,700 inmates with grenades and heavy 
machine-gun fire (HRW, 2003). For six years the Libyan regime denied the massacre, 
then in 2002 began informing some families of inmate deaths without returning the 
bodies or indicating how they had died (HRW, 2003; CSM, 2 September 2011). 
 
Since 2002, lawyers representing the Abu Salim Families had become the regime’s most 
vocal opponents, so the arrest of lawyers Fathi Terbil and Fraj Esharani two days before 
protests planned for 17 February 2011 led hundreds of protesters to gather outside a 
security forces building to demand their release (AIN, 16 February 2011; CSM, 16 
February 2011; CSM, 2 September 2011). The lawyers were released the next day but 
peaceful protests continued with demonstrators calling for Qadhafi’s resignation, 
resulting in security forces using tear gas and water cannons to disperse them (AI, 2011; 
AIN, 16 February 2011; CSM, 17 February 2011). Following his release Fathi Terbil 
stated: 
 
We, the Abu Salim families, ignited the revolution … The Libyan people were 
ready to rise up because of the injustice they experienced in their lives but they 
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needed a cause. So calling for the release of people … became the justification 
for their protest. (Oakes, 2011, pp. 224-225) 
 
The 2011 revolution 
The ‘Day of Rage’ in Benghazi and the eastern city al-Bayda started in tense 
circumstances but proceeded as relatively coordinated peaceful demonstrations, 
resembling the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt (CSM, 17 February 2011; New York 
Times [NYT], 22 February 2011). While overwhelmingly nonviolent, aside from a few 
protesters throwing stones at security forces buildings, Libyan security personnel 
retaliated violently – firing live ammunition into the crowds, killing up to 24 protesters 
and injuring scores (AI, 2011; CSM, 18 February 2011). Some protesters thus became 
involved in violent confrontations with security forces, with reports of 170 civilians 
killed and more than 1,500 injured in Benghazi and al-Bayda between 16 and 21 
February (AI, 2011). Incensed by the brutal crackdown, over the coming days 
spontaneous protests swiftly erupted across the country outrunning efforts to coordinate 
them. 
 
Uprisings spread widely, from Nalut and Zintan in the mountains; to al-Zawiya and 
Zuwara in the west; to Kufra in the south-east; and Misratah (Libya’s third city, located 
between Benghazi and Tripoli). The protesters set fire to buildings symbolic of state 
repression and unrest evolved into armed conflict at alarming speed, with the death toll 
(in addition to the Benghazi and al-Bayda death toll) climbing to 109 over a three-day 
period (AI, 2011; ICG, 2011a). In Tripoli the protests lagged behind, but by 21 February 
2011 protesters converged on the central Green Square (a symbol of Qadhafi’s power 
adorned by huge posters of the Colonel) where security forces opened fire on them (AI, 
2011). Witnesses stated that heavily armed regime forces and African mercenaries were 
thick in the streets of Tripoli, roving in trucks and firing indiscriminately (NYT, 21 
February 2011; NYT, 22 February 2011). As one protester stated: 
 
It is too late … I don’t think anyone is prepared to listen to Qaddafi anymore, and 
it is not one town or one area. It is the whole country in an uprising. (New York 
Times, 22 February 2011, p. 4) 
 
Qadhafi initially denied the protests, asserting “there are ‘no demonstrations at all in the 
streets’ and that ‘all my people are with me, they love me.’” (CSM, 1 March 2011, p. 3).  
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However, unable to suppress the uprising Qadhafi became defiant stating, “I will fight on 
to the last drop of my blood” (NYT, 22 February 2011, p. 2) and threatening to “purge 
Libya inch by inch, room by room, household by household, alley by alley, and 
individual by individual until the country is purified” (AI, 2011, p. 16). By late February 
violence had erupted across the country, diminishing any chance of a nonviolent 
resolution. Through its actions and declarations, Qadhafi’s regime had made it clear that 
nonviolent resistance was futile and the Libyan leader would ‘fight to the death’. In 
Sharp’s theoretical terms the Libyan population had withdrawn consent, with the failure 
of nonviolent action potentially attributable to an absence of sufficient ‘loci of power’ 
through which to spread adequate training in nonviolent technique; unlike in Egypt 
where Sharp’s scholarship had been disseminated prior to using nonviolence. However, 
in reality and in a Gramscian sense, Qadhafi had not actually established hegemony 
where active consent must be imbedded at the superstructural level, and had instead ruled 
through domination for over four decades – thus it was the absence of consent (meaning 
there was no consent to withdraw) that goes toward explaining the failure of Sharp’s 
nonviolent technique.  
 
A defiant military 
Unlike the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries whose tradition of non-partisan loyalty to 
state institutions allowed them to play mediatory roles in their own Arab Spring 
uprisings, the Libyan military had no such identity and had been kept deliberately 
fractured and weak by a suspicious Qadhafi (CSM, 22 February 2011; CSM, 1 March 
2011; ICG, 2011a). Not long after assuming power Qadhafi sought to counteract the 
power of the military, which he perceived as threatening his authority52. In addition to 
purging the military of individuals suspected of disloyalty and regularly rotating high-
ranking military personnel, Qadhafi abandoned professional and technical criteria as the 
basis for military recruitment (Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995). Loyalty superseded 
competence creating two groups within the armed forces: ‘professionals’, who were 
generally non-political; and ‘loyalists’ originating within the RCC and the Free Officers, 
who overtly supported the regime (Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 2008). 
                                                 
52 To augment and offset the military the 1973 popular revolution called for the creation of a people’s 
militia, primarily used to guard public buildings and man remote checkpoints, to be placed under the 
control of the RCC and independent of the army and police. In 1979 conscription and military training 
compulsory for all young people was introduced with the goal of replacing the traditional military with a 
popular military force. Neither initiative was ever able to unseat the military (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980. 
p. 122; St John, 2011, p. 63).  
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To supplement and counterweight the loyalists Qadhafi relied heavily on expatriate 
armed forces from East Germany, Syria and Cuba – further dividing the military 
(Vandewalle, 1995; Takeyh, 2000). The military was thus never assigned to safeguard 
the regime, the domain of Qadhafi’s special security forces, which were always stronger 
than the regular army (ICG, 2011a). Additionally, rank did not ensure actual influence, 
with loyalty to the revolution and membership of Qadhafi’s tribe determining 
appointment to sensitive security and army positions (El-Kikhia, 1997; Vandewalle, 
2008). Despite Qadhafi’s measures the military remained the one institution that 
threatened Qadhafi’s power – manifest in numerous coup and assassination attempts 
against the Colonel (Harris, 1986; Takeyh, 2000). The military reflected the discontent 
felt toward the revolutionary regime and served as a breeding ground for 
counterrevolutionaries (Naur, 1986). In a Gramscian sense while the military remained a 
superstructure of political society, rather than it serving as an institution through which to 
imbed revolutionary ideology, it was utilised as a vehicle of opposition and a source of 
violence against the regime. 
 
The dislocation and discontentment of the Libyan armed forces set the stage for heavy 
defections during the 2011 Libyan uprising (NYT, 22 February 2011). Forces of the 
former Libyan National Army abandoned their uniforms to join the rebels, whereby late 
February roughly 8,000 soldiers were reported to have defected (ICG, 2011b). The 
majority of military defections occurred in the eastern capital of Benghazi, the rebel 
army’s headquarters, while defectors in Tripoli and other western cities joined local 
military brigades (ICG, 2011b). The military’s indignation toward the revolutionary 
regime’s tactics was evidenced at the Tobruk command where Major General Suleiman 
Mahmoud refused to follow regime orders to fire on demonstrators. His aide, Major 
Salma Faraj Issa, recalled that, “‘This was something impossible for us,’ … ‘We were 
being asked to fire on our brothers, our sisters, we decided to stand with the people’” 
(CSM, 24 February 2011, p. 2). 
 
A major indication of the regime’s diminishing legitimacy was the defection of General 
Abdul Fatah Younis who had been Qadhafi’s interior minister and an original member of 
the RCC. Younis was dispatched to Benghazi to suppress armed protesters but instead 
defected becoming military commander of the rebel forces (ICG, 2011b; CSM, 1 March 
2011; CSM, 25 August 2011). Nevertheless, on 28 July 2011 Younis was assassinated 
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with the perpetrators believed to be either Islamists within the rebel forces or Qadhafi 
security forces (CSM, 25 August 2011; Oakes, 2011). The predominant role of the armed 
forces in the 2011 uprising ensured there was little chance the conflict would be resolved 
non-violently. Unlike Sharp’s nonviolent protesters who are trained to control anger and 
fear and direct that energy into a nonviolent power, the opposite is true of the army 
which provides discipline in warfare, where individual weaknesses like fear and the 
instinct of flight are instead channelled toward violent action (Gregg, 1935; Sharp, 1973). 
Additionally, in Sharp’s theoretical terms General Younis (as interior minister and 
original member of the RCC – the embodiment of the One September Revolution) had in 
the public transcript actively consented to the revolutionary ideology. However, in a 
Gramscian sense Younis’ defection provides evidence to counter ideological consent at 
the superstructural level (which could simply have been opportunistic consent) and 
confirmation of covert resistance in the private transcript, supporting Scott’s assertion 
that apparent consent in the public transcript can mask resistance to domination in the 
private transcript. 
 
Tribe and Islam as superstructures of resistance 
Tribalism runs deep in Libyan history, with no greater example than the tribes’ resistance 
to Italian colonialism (CSM, 25 August 2011). Despite the revolutionary regime’s initial 
hostility towards tribalism and attempts to eliminate it, in the face of increasing 
discontent in the 1990s Qadhafi turned to the tribes as a tool of socialisation to maintain 
his power (Obeidi, 2001; St John, 2011). In Gramscian terms, the tribe is an organic 
superstructure of consent in civil society and the site of hegemonic leadership, and will 
not be easily destroyed through the introduction of arbitrary structures that typically have 
a limited lifespan (Bocock, 1986, Forgacs, 1999). Tribal identity proved impervious to 
the regime’s interference, evidenced in studies by El Fathaly and Palmer (1980) in 1973 
and Obeidi (2001) in 1994, which found that tribal identity and loyalty remained very 
strong. 
 
Given the strength of tribalism, in July 1994 Qadhafi incorporated the tribes into the 
political structure by establishing the people’s social leadership committees (PSLCs) 
comprised of tribal leaders, heads of families and other prominent local officials53. The 
                                                 
53 In 1996, the PSLCs were brought into a national organization with members of local PSLCs sent to the 
national PSLC. The national committee was directed by a general coordinator, a position typically held by 
high-ranking military personnel for six-month terms. In March 2000, Qadhafi suggested that the general 
coordinator should be considered the formal head of state, in effect, his successor. Then in October 2009, 
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PSLCs were tasked with the distribution of state subsidies and maintaining social 
stability through the prevention of opposition, increasing kingship’s importance as a 
source of safety and support, and a mechanism through which to access distributive 
networks (Vandewalle, 2006; Obeidi, 2011; St John, 2011). Nevertheless, the practical 
reality of encouraging the PSLCs allowed Qadhafi to use the tribal system to his 
advantage, offering economic privileges and other advantages to tribes that were loyal 
and punishing those that were not, thus agitating intra-tribal rivalries (Telegraph, 4 
March 2011; CSM, 25 August 2011). In a 1992 interview with Muhammad Ibn Ghalbun 
founder of the exiled opposition group the Libyan Constitutional Union, he stated, “were 
Qadhafi to fall, neither the exiled secular opposition nor internal Islamist activists would 
prevail; instead, a civil war between or among various tribal factions was likely to 
develop” (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 230). 
 
With a history of tribal violence, and an environment of simmering tribal tensions, 
nonviolent collaboration was improbable. Nonetheless, during the 2011 uprising Libya’s 
biggest tribe the Warfalla abandoned the Qadhafi regime – evidence of a private 
transcript of simmering tribal animosity injected into the public transcript (Telegraph, 4 
March 2011). Other tribes also joined the anti-government side in violent conflict, with 
the eastern Agouri tribe’s leader Mohamed El Deeb stating, “For 42 years, Qaddafi put 
hatred between the tribes. But this is the first time they feel like they are working 
together” (CSM, 25 August 2011, p. 3). Despite the revolutionary regime’s attempts to 
manipulate and subvert the tribal system, the tribe remained a persistent feature of 
Libyan society supporting Gramsci’s assertion that organic historical superstructures are 
not easily extinguished and continue to serve as mechanisms of ideological consent even 
when arbitrary structures seek to replace them. This upholds Sharp’s theory that 
intangible factors can provide a source of consensually based political power. 
Nevertheless, where a ruling group abandons an organic superstructure it will no longer 
provide a source of political power, instead becoming a weapon of resistance for 
subordinate groups – manifest in overt resistance in the public transcript and/or covert 
resistance in the private transcript, however it does not then follow that these organic 
superstructures of opposition will support nonviolent principles. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Qadhafi urged the national PSLC to appoint his son Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi as general coordinator with no 
term limit (St John, 2011, p. 75). 
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Islam as a historical superstructure of consent, or what Sharp terms an intangible factor 
of political power, remains a primary unit of loyalty and identity in Libyan society. Islam 
nurtured resistance against foreign rule during the colonial war, and it played a similar 
role under Qadhafi’s authoritarian rule (Harris, 1986; Obeidi, 2001). In a society like 
Libya where Islam has played a prominent role in shaping beliefs, values and attitudes, 
Qadhafi’s increasingly radical interpretation of Islam set him at odds with both the 
religious establishment and the Libyan population, ensuring that Islam became a weapon 
of violent resistance rather than a source of political consent for the regime (Anderson, 
1983; Vandewalle, 1995). 
 
Islamic opposition intensified during the 1980s and 1990s to which Qadhafi took a zero-
tolerance approach, declaring opponents “more dangerous than AIDS” (Vandewalle, 
1995, p. 109).  Nonetheless, under Qadhafi’s tenure several Islamic opposition groups 
were established, the most prominent being: the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), 
born in Afghanistan in the early-1990s (which numerous individuals killed during the 
Abu Salim massacre belonged to); and the Libyan Islamic Group (the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s local branch – established in Egypt in 1928 and brought to Libya by 
Egyptian teachers and students)54 (Vandewalle, 2008; Al-Werfalli, 2011; ICG, 2011a). 
Other Islamic opposition groups included the Islamic Liberation Movement and the 
Islamic Martyrs’ Movement, both of which supported a jihadist culture and were 
proficient and committed practitioners of violence (Takeyh, 2000). 
 
While militant Islamists were a source of annoyance for the Libyan leader, by the end of 
the 1990s Qadhafi had successfully suppressed them, aided by their own internal 
divisions that prevented a united front (Takeyh, 2000; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Despite the 
absence of continued Islamic opposition within Libya, Islamic resistance remained active 
outside the country (Vandewalle, 2008; St John, 2011). Although Islam provides a node 
of consent within Libyan society, which in a Gramscian sense performs as an organic 
ideological superstructure of consent and in Sharp’s terminology as a loci of power to 
control the authority of the ruling group, with LIFG adherents trained to “get into knife 
fights and other situations involving extreme and life-threatening violence” (Vandewalle, 
2008, p. 96) it would not serve as a source of nonviolent resistance during the 2011 
uprising.   
                                                 
54 In March 2011, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group changed its name to the Libyan Islamic Movement 
for Change (ICG, 2011b). 
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Economic and political opposition 
Despite Libya’s relative economic security compared to other North African countries it 
is understood that grievances over corruption, unemployment and poverty propelled the 
17 February 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ (AI, 2011; ICG, 2011a). Over recent decades average 
Libyan living standards were eroded, leaving Libyans exasperated over what they 
perceive as years of poorly planned, piecemeal development of a country that “given a 
population of a mere six million … ought to resemble Dubai” (ICG, 2011a, p. 2). During 
the 2000s the regime promoted economic liberalization but it did not induce the 
anticipated economic revival, where after almost four decades under a socialist command 
economy crude oil continued to account for 95 percent of exports and 70-80 percent of 
government revenues with private investment dormant at around two percent of GNP 
(Takeyh, 2000; St John, 2011). 
 
Despite Libya’s economic wealth a majority of Libyans work at least two jobs, one 
typically in the public sector accounting for 75 percent of employment where salaries 
remain pitiful and irregular, while approximately 30 percent of the Libyan population is 
unemployed or underemployed leaving a massive untapped labour pool (Takeyh, 2000; 
ICG, 2011a; St John, 2011). The reduced standard of living, the employment situation 
and an increasingly expensive cost of living fuelled the epidemic of corruption rife across 
state enterprises (Al-Werfalli, 2011; St John, 2011). Corruption has been justified as 
rightfully restoring to the Libyan people what was stolen from them by the state, with 
one of Al-Werfalli’s research participants stating “By stealing the thief’s money, you are 
not committing a crime, you are getting back your stolen money” (Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 
83). Contrary to Sharp’s (1973) assertion that a ruler’s political power can be restrained 
through the withdrawal of consent of a country’s human resources, in Libya where the 
major material resource was controlled by Qadhafi and where the majority of the 
population was superfluous to economic growth, they were deprived of targets of 
nonviolent resistance to influence the economic base.  
 
Both Obeidi (2001) and Al-Werfalli’s (2011) research found that while numerous 
respondents desired political change and wanted to contribute to the change process, they 
felt they had no capacity to influence the system through the basic people’s congresses 
(BPCs), which were regarded as ineffective channels of political participation essentially 
controlled by the regime. Not convinced by the efficacy of the political participation 
 
 
53 
process and frightened that any expression of criticism would be severely punished, 
numerous respondents withdrew from the BPCs entirely, accounting for the poor 
attendance records (Obeidi, 2001; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Moreover, Al-Werfalli’s (2011) 
study found that even those that attended the BPCs occasionally never participated in 
debate. While Sharp (1973) acknowledges that under such conditions sufficient ‘loci of 
power’ will be absent or limited in its effectiveness to wield independent action, Sharp 
maintains that irrespective of these structural circumstances it is through overt 
expressions of individual human agency that consent can be withdrawn to modify an 
authoritarian regime’s sources of political power. In opposition to Sharp, Scott (1990) 
argues that under systems of domination individuals will instead seek to covertly resist 
an authoritarian regime where acts of anonymous resistance such as non-participation 
enables a non-confrontational expression of opposition. 
 
Political alienation from authoritarian regimes arises from an individual’s awareness that 
the imposed political system is obstructive to the achievement of their goals and political 
expressions (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Thus where political participation is circumscribed and 
forms of protest and resistance are blocked, alienation will manifest in disguised forms of 
resistance such as desertion and false compliance to avoid direct confrontation with an 
oppressive system (Al-Werfalli, 2011). This corresponds with Scott’s (1990) assertion 
that there will always be an ambiguous or coded version of the subordinate groups’ 
private transcript in the public transcript providing terrain on which to discover 
resistance. Al-Werfalli (2011) hypothesised that the respondents’ withdrawal from BPC 
participation was indicative of political alienation and an expression of non-compliance. 
This was supported as most respondents indicated that instead of airing grievances in the 
BPCs, their chosen channels of political resistance were either to talk privately with 
trusted individuals or to remain silent55 (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Political alienation leads to a 
sense of powerlessness whereby people believe the choices available to them are 
irrelevant or are in fact non-choices, so no matter what the individual does they feel 
powerless to have any impact (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Where individuals are denied their 
legitimate rights over an extended period a state of powerlessness is created, leading to 
apathy and accompanying feelings of impotence and aggression, with violence the 
predicable end result (May, 1972). “Violence arises not out of superfluity of power but 
out of powerlessness”  (May, 1972, p. 23). 
 
                                                 
55 See Appendix C for the results of Al-Werfalli’s study on the methods of expressing disapproval. 
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Given many Libyans were left powerless in a political system that stifled opinion and 
suppressed dissent, and with a remarkable number of respondents in Al-Werfalli’s (2011) 
research declaring their support for violence to change the system, it is unsurprising that 
the 2011 uprising could not be resolved through nonviolent action. Despite Sharp’s 
assumption that consent (whether freely given or induced through intimidation) is the 
basis of political power, the reality of Libya provides evidence that consent is a far more 
complex phenomenon meaning Sharp’s theory will be limited. Apparent consent 
(characterized behaviourally by either overt support or passive support) in the public 
transcript can in fact disguise covert resistance (ideological opposition) in the private 
transcript, where if sustained for a long duration will breed tendencies toward violence. 
Thus as Scott asserts subordinate groups have not consented to domination, which is 
evidenced through the everyday forms of resistance of their private transcript injected 
into the public transcript. 
 
Youth and violence 
That the 2011 Libyan uprising and other Arab Spring revolutions were initiated by 
disaffected youth is somewhat expected given younger people are more often at the 
forefront of movements for social and political change (CSM, 24 February 2011). In 
Libya younger people have historically proven an anti-regime source, evidenced after the 
1975 RCC coup attempt when university student uprisings started in Benghazi and 
Tripoli, in which the killing of ten anti-Qadhafi student’s sparked further protests 
(Bearman, 1986; Vandewalle, 1998). More recently, the rise of Islamic opposition 
movements has been almost completely a youth phenomenon, with the anti-cartoon 
protest already mentioned instigated by young people (Vandewalle, 1998; Al-Werfalli, 
2011). In 1990, 65 percent of Libya’s population was under twenty-five years of age, 
with the 15-24 demographic accounting for 867,000 of the total population, making 
Libya a youthful country.  In 2010, approximately 36 percent of the population were 
under the age of 15 with only four percent over 65, exposing a significant generation gap 
between the average Libyan and the ageing revolutionary regime (Obeidi, 2001; Al-
Werfalli, 2011). Thus the inability of the Qadhafi regime to accommodate the aspirations 
of its youth and facilitate their entry as productive members of the economy would serve 
to create lurking discontentment with explosive potential (Takeyh, 2000, p. 159). 
 
Al-Werfalli’s (2011) study found that Libya’s youth were the most dissatisfied with their 
circumstances and expressed acute alienation from the political system. When Al-
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Werfalli (2011) asked respondents about the methods they would support to bring about 
change, centring on the options of nonviolent or violent action, the prevailing view 
among youthful respondents, falling into the 18-37 demographic, was a determined 
support for violence. However, nobody in the 57-and-over age group supported violent 
methods, largely advocating peaceful resistance. When elaborating on their support for 
violence, youthful respondents regarded nonviolent means to be futile against an 
intolerant regime and armed resistance the only effective course of action (Al-Werfalli, 
2011). 
 
Given the central role of Libya’s youth during the 2011 uprising and their predisposition 
toward violence to effect change, it was unlikely that the uprising could be resolved 
nonviolently. Libya’s youth serves as a ‘loci of power’ that has been continually 
obstructed from overtly expressing their dissatisfaction with the revolutionary regime in 
the public transcript. Thus, contrary to Sharp’s assertion that such a loci could provide a 
source of nonviolent action, Libya’s youth instead became a source of violent opposition, 
nurtured in their private transcript waiting to be unleashed into the public transcript as 
evidenced during the 2011 Libyan revolution. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine Libya’s political, economic and social 
structures to determine the predominant source of the Qadhafi regime’s political power, 
and thus elucidate an explanation regarding which factors precluded Sharp’s 
consensually based strategy of nonviolent action succeeding in the 2011 Libyan 
revolution. Through a detailed analysis of Libya’s history from the nineteenth century as 
a traditional tribal society, to the monarchical period starting in 1951 when oil was 
discovered and commercialised, through to the Qadhafi era from 1969 to 2011, a clear 
picture of the internal dynamics of the Libyan system has emerged in which domination 
served as the underlying source of the revolutionary regime’s political power. This has 
highlighted that the longevity of Qadhafi’s regime is insufficient evidence to claim the 
existence of political legitimacy based on Sharp’s ‘free’ consent or Gramsci’s 
‘spontaneous’ consent and hegemony, but that it is rather more reasonable to conjecture 
that the enduring nature of the regime was due to the constant application of force, which 
procured the Libyan population’s acquiescence. Moreover, through detailed analysis of 
Libya’s history and the events of the 2011 revolution it is evident that consent is a vastly 
more complex phenomenon than asserted by Sharp, requiring a more integrated approach 
for nonviolent action to become a viable strategy to effect regime change. 
 
The structure-superstructure model of consensually based power as proposed by Gramsci 
is a useful analytical instrument in highlighting the enduring nature of the tribe and Islam 
as organic historical superstructures of consent within Libyan society (superstructures 
abandoned by Qadhafi’s regime and instead used as weapons of resistance against 
authoritarian rule). Additionally, Gramsci’s superstructure approach validates Sharp’s 
assumption that intangible factors (psychological and ideological) can serve as sources of 
consensually based political power. The strength of Gramsci’s theory has been in 
identifying that consent is a variable phenomenon, which is procured at multiple levels. 
While consent can be established at the economic base (structure) through the social 
relations of the material and technical instruments of production this will be insufficient 
for long-lasting consent and must go beyond the economic base to the superstructure (the 
realm of ideologies within both civil and political society) for hegemony to be 
established. Although Sharp also includes material resources as a source of consent, 
unlike Gramsci he does not distinguish between the tiered platforms of economic and 
ideological consensus, thus he does not adequately capture the full dynamics of political 
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systems in which economic consent will only sustain authority for a finite period unless 
accompanied by ideological mechanisms of consent.  
 
Where consent is authentic, in Gramscian terms it originates as ‘spontaneous’ consent 
before evolving into ideological consensus at the superstructural level, while for Sharp it 
begins and remains as ‘free’ consent unless sanctions are involved (to be discussed next). 
In this sense ‘authentic consent’ can either manifest as ‘overt/active consent’ at both the 
behavioural and ideological level or as ‘passive consent’ (or more accurately 
‘acquiescence’) expressed behaviourally as conformity, but will not involve consensus at 
the ideological level. One explanation for the absence of ideological consent is that 
individuals may not question the policies/ideologies of a regime if their current needs are 
being satisfied. By tracing the history of Libya it has been shown that the tribe and Islam 
as organic superstructures of consent provided the Sanusiya Order, the monarchy, and 
initially Qadhafi, with the Libyan population’s behavioural and ideological consensus or 
‘overt/active consent’. Behavioural conformity (‘passive consent/acquiescence’) was 
established without ideological consensus, as was the case when Tripolitania united with 
the Cyrenaican tribes while fighting Italian colonialism but did not ideologically consent 
to the Sanusiya Order, and also when Qadhafi used economic wealth to initially garner 
behavioural support – only after which he attempted to establish revolutionary 
ideological consensus. 
 
Incorporating Gramsci’s structure-superstructure framework with Scott’s public 
transcript and private transcript theory has proven beneficial in determining whether 
seeming hegemony in Libya’s public transcript is ‘authentic consent’ or if it conceals 
resistance to domination in the population’s private transcript. Contrary to Sharp’s 
assertion that ‘intimidated’ consent through the use of sanctions remains the basis of 
consensual power (Sharp considers that an individual’s choice to be obedient despite 
sanctions is indicative of consent, which differs from the notion of domination where 
‘real’ choice is absent and is replaced with acquiescence through the use of coercion), 
Gramsci argues that where ‘spontaneous’ consent declines or where genuine hegemony 
has not been established the state will resort to rule through domination. Similarly, in 
Scott’s terms apparent behavioural conformity in the public transcript can disguise 
‘covert/passive resistance’ to domination in the private transcript of subordinate groups – 
manifest as ideological opposition or as anonymous acts of behavioural resistance 
injected into the public transcript. Through the examination of Libya under Qadhafi’s 
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revolutionary regime it has become evident that while the Libyan leader initially 
established what Sharp terms ‘free’ consent through intangible factors such as personal 
charisma and Islam, and distribution of material resources, when Qadhafi arbitrarily 
imposed his revolutionary political system he immediately alienated the majority of 
Libyans, abandoned organic superstructures of consent, and instead employed 
domination to enforce behavioural conformity and revolutionary legitimacy. 
 
However, the Libyan population’s response to domination continued to support a picture 
of apparent hegemony in the public transcript. ‘Overt/active consent’ was seemingly 
embodied in the regime’s most ardent adherents, the revolutionary committees (RCs) 
(although Al-Werfalli’s 2011 study argued this was often opportunistic behaviour rather 
than ‘authentic ideological consent’). Meanwhile ‘passive consent/acquiescence’ was 
manifest in the population’s acceptance of the regime’s economic rewards, with 
negligible ‘overt/active resistance’, apart from Islamic opposition groups that were 
quickly suppressed (and thus removed from the public transcript). However, Al-
Werfalli’s 2011 research challenged the image of the public transcript’s ‘authentic 
consent’, demonstrating that acts of ‘covert/passive resistance’ continued in the 
population’s private transcript. Research participants described choosing to talk privately 
with trusted friends and/or remained silent as a means of behavioural and ideological 
resistance, and that non-participation at the basic people’s congresses (BPCs) was a 
behavioural manifestation of resistance – the injection of their private transcript into the 
public transcript and evidence to counter that silence gives consent (those who did 
participate at the BPCs did so out of fear from the threat of force confirming rule through 
domination). 
 
This evidence supports the notion that ‘authentic consent’ was not operating in Libya 
under Qadhafi, but rather as Scott argues the majority of Libyans were resisting a system 
of domination using disguised forms of resistance. Thus in Libya, the population could 
not withdraw their consent in the way Sharp asserts (such as through labour strikes, 
withdrawal from government employment or refusal to provide the government with 
revenue voluntarily), as the regime was economically independent of the people through 
exclusive access to vast oil revenues and foreign workers, with the population largely 
reliant on the economic benefits of government employment for their day-to-day living. 
While ‘authentic consent’ can serve as the basis of political power (evidenced through 
the use of the tribe and Islam as organic superstructures of consent) this will not always 
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be the reality. The longevity and seeming stability of the Libyan regime was not by 
virtue of ‘authentic consent’ but was instead maintained through force and coercion.  
 
Scott’s public-private transcript analysis was pivotal in elucidating that domination was 
the Libyan regime’s primary source of political power, and that the majority of Libyans 
were responding to domination through ‘covert/passive resistance’ – evident in a 
sometimes overt form within the military, the tribes, and the Islamic opposition. Chapter 
four discussed the multifarious historical and contemporary sources of violence in the 
2011 Libyan uprising. Perhaps the most salient point is that ‘covert/passive resistance’ 
sustained for a long duration in a situation of powerlessness, where ‘real’ choices are 
denied by the regime’s domination of all social structures, creates a state of apathy, 
which is a breeding ground for violence. Thus it may be concluded that individuals who 
live in a state of daily oppression in which their ‘covert/passive resistance’ is confined to 
their private transcript where feelings of impotence and aggression are uprooted support 
for the use of violence will be more predominant. Given Qadhafi’s willingness to use 
military repression against the nonviolent protesters in the 2011 uprising (a perpetuation 
of the revolutionary regime’s historical tactic of domination through violence) it was 
even more probable that individuals in a constant state of ‘covert/passive resistance’ 
would retaliate with violence. Therefore, Sharp’s theory of consent upon which his 
strategy of nonviolent action is based would seemingly be unsuitable within the Libyan 
context. 
 
In applying the theories of Sharp, Gramsci and Scott to the Libyan context it has been 
demonstrated that in reality consent is a far more complex and variable phenomenon than 
articulated in Gene Sharp’s theory of consent, and that local conditions will therefore 
impact the effectiveness of his nonviolent strategy. A limitation of Sharp’s theory is that 
it assumes consent is always the basis of political power expressed either as ‘free’ or 
‘intimidated’ consent. The Libyan situation suggests that consent is not a simple, linear 
concept, but has behavioural and ideological manifestations, and can be procured through 
enduring historical sources of consent or through arbitrary political institutions with more 
limited lifespans. Additionally, while consent can seemingly provide evidence of 
hegemony, it could in fact be masking domination as the source of political power, which 
Sharp does not address. 
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Moreover, as demonstrated in the Libyan context nonviolent action (as both a 
behavioural and ideological concept) will only be a suitable weapon of resistance within 
certain milieus. Circumstances in which nonviolent action could be instigated include 
where ‘overt/active consent’ has become ‘overt/active resistance’ such as the defections 
of Qadhafi’s inner circle during the 2011 uprising (or where opportunistic notions yield 
to an ideological aversion of current conditions). Additionally, where ‘passive 
consent/acquiescence’ is manifest, whereby apparent behavioural conformity could belie 
ideological ambivalence or ambiguity providing terrain on which to introduce and 
nurture nonviolent action toward supporting opposition to prevailing conditions – such as 
where nonviolent methods of ‘overt/active resistance’ toward an oppressive state have 
become the main target of an authoritarian regime and could benefit from support from a 
wider section of the population which may not have ideologically considered the long-
term consequences of the environment in which they live.  
 
However, where ‘covert/passive resistance’ is the underlying context (and as such it is 
more likely that domination has become the main source of political power) the strategy 
of nonviolent action will not find many receptive adherents (given the probability that 
attempts at ‘overt/active resistance’ have already been crushed) who out of their state of 
powerlessness are more likely to have resolved that violent conflict is the only outcome. 
While ‘passive consent/acquiescence’ and ‘covert/passive resistance’ will behaviourally 
appear almost identical because the state represses any sign of overt resistance, it is in 
determining the difference between these categories (to be discovered in the content of 
their private transcript) that will elucidate whether consent or domination is present, and 
therefore determine whether nonviolent action presents the most effective method 
through which to effect political change. Moreover, where a state is independent of its 
people’s labour and consent, as was the case in Libya, then withdrawing consent 
nonviolently will not be sufficient to bring down the state.  
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Appendix A – Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from 1969 to 1975  
 
 
Name Region Social background Educational 
background 
Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi* Middle Lower Military 
Abd as-Salam Jallud* South Lower Military 
Muhammad al-Mugaryef*** East Middle Military 
Bashir Hawadi** South Lower Military 
Abu Bakr Yunus Jabir* East Lower Military 
Al-Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi* West Lower Military 
Mustapha al-Kharubi* West Lower Military 
Omar al-Muhayshi** West Upper-Middle Military 
Mukhtar al-Gerwy*** West Middle Military 
Abd al-Munim al-Huni*** West Middle Military 
Muhammed Najm*** East Middle Military 
Awad Hamza*** East Lower Military 
 
 
* The only politically active RCC members after 1975. 
** Lead the 1975 coup against Qadhafi. 
*** Forced from the RCC as members of the pro-Muhayshi faction failed coup of 
 1975. 
 
 
Source: Vandewalle (2008) 
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Appendix B – Structure of People’s Authority System 
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Source: Al-Qaddafi (1980) 
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 Appendix C – Methods of expressing disapproval (%) 
 
 
Contact the administration body concerned   21.6 
Contact the Leadership     0.2 
Contact the revolutionary committee in the commune 29.3 
Bring the matter to the BPC at a meeting   12.8 
Bring the matter to the media     4.4 
Talk in public places      0.5 
Talk privately with trusted individuals   94.6 
Keep silent       68.9 
Other        23.0 
Do not know       0.6 
 
 
Source: Al-Werfalli (2011) 
 
 
